Impact of Fiscal Policy
during the Crisis
Ann-Louise Winther, Economics
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
In order to dampen the impact of the financial and economic crisis, in cluding large increases in unemployment, many countries have imple mented fiscal stimulus packages during the past year, and some coun tries are planning further measures in 2010. The fiscal policy responses of individual countries to the crisis reflect the extent of the economic slowdown in the country concerned, the fiscal room for manoeuvre and the size of the automatic stabilisers. Furthermore, monetary policy has been eased with interest rates close to zero, and many countries have used unconventional monetary-policy instruments to facilitate credit intermediation. Consequently, the increased focus on easing fiscal policy should also be viewed in light of the restrictions to further monetary-policy relaxation.
This article takes a closer look at the fiscal policy pursued during the crisis and its macroeconomic effects. First it describes the fiscal stimulus measures that have been implemented and planned across OECD coun tries and how they have affected public finances in the respective coun tries. In general, the degree of fiscal loosening varies considerably from country to country. In most countries expansionary discretionary fiscal policy combined with the effect of the automatic stabilisers will lead to substantial deterioration of public finances in 2009 and 2010.
The second half of the article explores the potential impacts of expan sionary fiscal policy given by the so-called fiscal multipliers. In both the oretical and empirical literature the multipliers range widely in size. They are dependent on the saving behaviour of households and business enterprises, fiscal sustainability and the extent of foreign trade, among other things. It is also important whether fiscal policy is relaxed on the revenue or expenditure side. In the short term there is empirical evi dence that increased public investment and increased public consump tion have a greater impact than tax cuts, but the impact of tax cuts may increase in the longer term as the larger savings are channelled into private consumption. The last part of the article discusses why the effects of fiscal policy during the current crisis may deviate from the esti mated effects in more "normal" times. If households and business enter prises have limited access to credit, the impact of expansionary fiscal policy may be relatively large. On the other hand, the private sector may choose savings over consumption due to growing uncertainty about future income and employment as a result of the current economic crisis, which would weaken the stabilising effect of fiscal policy. Fiscal sustain ability also influences the impact of active fiscal policy on economic activity. Large government deficits and growing government debt may increase uncertainty about the economic outlook, which may in turn increase the private sector's propensity to save. In addition, growing government debt may lead to higher interest rates – in the form of increases in the general level of interest rates or in the yield spreads of individual countries – thereby countering the fiscal stimulation.
In order to achieve the greatest possible impact of fiscal policy during the crisis it is crucial that the fiscal measures are timely and targeted. Sustainability also determines whether there is scope for further re laxation in individual countries. Public finances will deteriorate sub stantially in many countries up to 2010, and near-term consolidation is therefore needed in many cases, particularly since a number of countries are facing demographic challenges in the coming years. The measures should therefore be temporary to avoid permanent deterioration of public finances.
FISCAL POLICY IN LIGHT OF THE CRISIS
Size of fiscal stimulus measures across countries
As a result of the financial and economic crisis, countries worldwide have implemented fiscal stimulus measures to mitigate the steep decline in demand and curb the rise in unemployment. The possibility of further monetary-policy stimulation is limited, and this has led to growing interest in active fiscal policy. The extent of the fiscal stimulus packages varies from country to country. Measured by the annual change in the structural government budget balance, the OECD countries are loos ening fiscal policy by just under 2 per cent of the gross domestic prod uct, GDP, in 2009, and further measures in the order of 1 per cent of GDP are expected in 2010, cf. Chart 1. In the euro area the stimulus measures total almost 2 per cent of GDP in 2009-10, while the US meas ures amount to almost 3 per cent of GDP during the same period. There are also great variations in the fiscal policies pursued within the EU during the crisis. Germany, Finland, Sweden and Denmark are among the EU member states that have eased their fiscal policies in 2009 and plan further measures in 2010. Denmark is one of the member states where fiscal policy has been eased the most. Measured by direct revenue impacts, Denmark's fiscal policy is eased by 1.9 per cent of GDP in 2009, according to Economic Survey, August 2009, and further measures cor responding to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2010 have been decided so far.
| ACTIVE FISCAL POLICIES IN OECD COUNTRIES IN 2009 AND 2010 | Chart 1 |
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| Note: Discretionary fiscal policy is approximated as the year-on-year change in the structural budget balance. For the structural balance, the OECD's estimate for the underlying balance has been applied, which is adjusted for the cycle and one-offs. A negative (positive) change in the underlying balance indicates loosening (tightening) of fiscal policy. Italy, which according to the OECD is tightening fiscal policy in 2009 and loosening it 2010, and Belgium, which conducts neutral fiscal policy in 2009 and loosens it a bit in 2010, have not been included. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 85, June 2009. |
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Other EU member states, including France and Spain, have imple mented stimulus packages in 2009, but are expected to consolidate their public finances as early as 2010. Finally, some EU member states already had substantial government budget deficits at the onset of the crisis, and despite the economic downturn they have therefore had to pursue a neutral or tight fiscal policy throughout 2009. Greece and Hungary are among the member states that are tightening their fiscal policies in 2009.
Fiscal policy should be viewed in light of the degree to which the individual countries' economies are affected by the crisis and their fiscal scope as expressed by the government budget balance and debt at the onset of the crisis. Chart 2a-b illustrates the relation between the size of the fiscal measures and the fiscal scope at the onset of the crisis across OECD countries. The Charts show that the countries with large govern ment deficits and debt in 2008 have generally eased their fiscal policies less than countries with greater fiscal room for manoeuvre. In this way countries that consolidated their public finances during the "good times" have been able to use fiscal policy more actively to stabilise the economy. Chart 2c shows the relation between the scope of fiscal measures and the extent of the economic downturn in individual countries, measured by the size of the output gap. The countries with the lowest output compared to the potential output level generally ease their fiscal policies more.
| EXPANSIONARY FISCAL POLICY IN 2008-10 | Chart 2 |
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| Note: At: Austria, Au: Australia, Be: Belgium, Ca: Canada, Dk: Denmark, Fi: Finland, Fr: France, Ger: Germany, Lu: Luxembourg, NL: Netherlands, NZ: New Zealand, Pol: Polen, Por: Portugal, Sp: Spain, Swe: Sweden, Swi: Switzerland, United Kingdom: UK. Discretionary fiscal loosening in the individual countries is stated as the negative change in the structural government balance (OECD estimates of the underlying balance) in the period 2008-10. The Chart only shows countries that have, on aggregate, eased their fiscal policies from 2008 to 2010. Automatic stabilisers are OECD calculations of budget elasticity and indicate the change in the government budget balance as a percentage of GDP on a change in the output gap of 1 per cent of potential GDP. The lines indicate the estimated linear relationship between observations. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 85, June 2009 and Girouard and André, Measuring cyclically-adjusted budget balances for OECD countries, OECD, Working Paper, No. 34, 2005. |
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In addition, there is a slight negative relation between the scope of the fiscal loosening and the size of the automatic stabilisers, cf. Chart 2d. The automatic stabilisers are a measure of the degree to which govern ment revenue and expenditure respond to cyclical fluctuations1 . Fiscal relaxation has generally been substantial in countries with small automatic stabilisers, such as the USA, Canada and Australia, and rela tively less substantial in most EU member states. Among the exceptions are Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands, where the automatic sta bilisers are relatively large, but where the expansion of fiscal policy has nevertheless been substantial. According to OECD calculations, Denmark has the largest automatic stabilisers of all the OECD countries. The strength of the automatic stabilisers depends, among other factors, on the size of the public sector, the structure of the tax system and the replacement ratio for transfer payments. In the present slump, the strength of the automatic stabilisers in Denmark means that govern ment expenditure for transfer payments, etc. increases relatively much, and that tax revenue falls significantly due to falling output and rising unemployment. This automatically eases public finances, thereby damp ening the slowdown in economic activity and employment and reducing the need for actual discretionary relaxation of fiscal policy. The effect of the automatic stabilisers depends on the type of shock causing the present economic downturn. However, it is difficult to identify the underlying shock to the economy, which may arise both on the demand and the supply side. If it is assumed that about half of the economic setback in Denmark is driven by a decline in private consumption, and that the other half is driven by a decline in exports, automatic sta bilisation means that the decline in unemployment will be reduced by about 30,000 persons in 2009, cf. multiplier calculations in Olesen and Winther (2009)2 . The effect is thus about twice the 16,000 persons that constitute the estimated employment effect of the discretionary re laxation in 2009, cf. Economic Survey, August 2009. The numbers are in line with the estimate that about two thirds of the deterioration of the government budget balance from 2008 to 2009 is cyclical and the result of automatic stabilisation, while about one third is attributed to discretionary relaxation3 . The automatic stabilisation of employment should also be seen in light of the expected fall in total employment of about 80,000 persons from 2008 to 2009.
Outlook for public finances
Together with the effect of the automatic stabilisers, the expansionary fiscal policy results in a weakening of the government budget balance in most countries. A significant deterioration of public finances in the OECD countries is expected up to 2010, cf. Chart 3. The deficit in 2010 is expected to be just under 9 per cent of GDP in the OECD countries taken as one, and 7 per cent of GDP in the euro area, according to OECD, Economic Outlook No. 85, June 2009. In both cases this is a weakening of the balance of just over 5 per cent of GDP since 2008. Even countries with relatively large government surpluses in 2008, such as Denmark, Sweden and Finland, will have deficits in both 2009 and 2010. To some extent this reflects that it is politically difficult to implement fiscal tightening during an upswing that matches the discretionary fiscal easing during a slump. The asymmetric trend of active fiscal policy con tributes to increasing government budget deficits in an economic downturn.
| GOVERNMENT BUDGET BALANCES OF OECD COUNTRIES IN 2008-10 | Chart 3 |
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| Note: The balance in a given year is stated as the sum of the coloured bars, except for countries with a surplus in 2008. In the latter, the deficit in 2010 is stated as the sum of the yellow and red bars. Norway, with a government budget surplus of 18.8 per cent of GDP, and Iceland, with a deficit of 14.3 per cent of BNP in 2008, have been omitted. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 85, June 2009. |
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According to the OECD, just under half of the deterioration of public finances from 2008 to 2010 can be attributed to a drop in the structural budget balance, while a little more than half of the deterioration is ascribable to the effect of the automatic stabilisers. In Denmark a slightly larger share of the deterioration of the government budget balance is cyclical due to the large automatic stabilisers. As a result of the fiscal measures implemented and planned, combined with the effect of the automatic stabilisers, the Danish government budget balance will change from a surplus of 3.4 per cent of GDP to a deficit of 5.6 per cent of GDP in 2010, cf. the article The Danish Economy 2009-11, p. 33. This is a deteri oration of the government budget balance of 9 per cent or almost kr. 160 billion. Denmark has not experienced such a rapid deterioration of public finances since World War II, and the budget balance weakening is sig nificantly greater than in most other countries. The significant deteri oration of public finances in most OECD countries leads to a rapid increase in government debt. An increase of almost 16 per cent of GDP is expected in the euro area from 2008 to 2010, after which the average government debt will be almost 90 per cent of GDP, while the US debt burden will increase from just over 70 per cent of GDP in 2008 to almost 100 per cent of GDP in 2010, cf. the latest OECD estimates. In Denmark gross govern ment debt will increase from just over 33 per cent of GDP in 2008 to just over 42 per cent of GDP in 2010, according to Economic Survey, August 2009.
EFFECTS OF FISCAL POLICY
Fiscal policy as a means of stabilisation
The object of fiscal relaxation is to dampen the impact of the crisis on economic activity and employment through increased demand. Con siderable interest in fiscal stimulation has arisen following an extended period of economic policy focusing more on structural reforms to strengthen the labour supply and the long-term sustainability of public finances. In light of the financial crisis and the weakened opportunity to stabilise the economy through monetary policy, the degree to which fiscal policy may help to stabilise the economy without jeopardising long-term fiscal sustainability has become a central issue. The appli cation of fiscal policy as a means to stabilise the economy was de veloped after the Great Depression in the 1930s based on the famous economist John Keynes' General Theory. According to traditional Keynesian theory, increased government spending will stimulate aggre gate demand, either directly in the form of increased public con sumption and investment, or indirectly by increasing private incomes through tax cuts or higher transfers. The degree to which expansionary fiscal policy affects economic activity can be expressed by fiscal multi pliers. The uncertainty as to the effect of active fiscal policy is attrib utable to the wide range in the size of the multipliers in theoretic and empirical literature, cf. Box 1. The reasons for the great variation are that the multipliers are difficult to estimate and that their size depends on a large number of economic factors. For an expansionary fiscal pol icy to have an effect, it is crucial that there is spare capacity in the economy. If the economy operates with high capacity utilisation and a low unemployment rate, expansionary fiscal policy will lead to higher price inflation and higher imports. In addition, the multipliers also de pend on the private sector's propensity to save and the level of foreign trade. In a small, open economy, economic activity is therefore not only influenced by domestic fiscal policy, but also by the fiscal policy of its trading partners.
| FISCAL MULTIPLIERS | Box 1 |
Fiscal multipliers measure the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on GDP and are given as the change in GDP in the event of a change in the government budget balance that is attributable to active fiscal policy. In economic literature, the fiscal multipliers range widely in size. According to the original Keynesian theory, they are relatively high and above 1, which means that a given fiscal relaxation will increase output by more than the magnitude of the original relaxation. Numerous economic arguments are also put forward for the multipliers being smaller or even assuming negative values. Expansions of the simple Keynesian theory allow for increased public investment resulting in higher interest rates or strengthening a floating exchange rate, thus reducing private investment or weakening net exports. This effect may be amplified if expansionary fiscal policy leads to government debt that increases the uncertainty about fiscal sustainability or the risk of higher inflation. Such impacts may raise the risk premium and thus interest rates. If the economy is running at almost full capacity and unemployment is low, expansionary fiscal policy may also lead to price and wage inflation, which may reduce the impact of fiscal policy on private demand. The crowding-out of fiscal stimulation may also be direct if part of the increase in private demand is met by imports. As a result, the multipliers are generally smaller in small, open economies than in larger economies, because part of the stimulation benefits the trading partners. There are also arguments claiming that active fiscal policy has no effect at all on private demand. Prudent consumers foresee the need for the public sector to finance current fiscal relaxation by raising taxes in the future. If consumers want to smooth their consumption over life, they will save up an amount corresponding to the fiscal relaxation. In this way private savings increase by the amount by which public savings decline. This is called Ricardian equivalence and implies that fiscal policy has no effect at all on demand. Ricardian equivalence in its strictest form is not very likely as it is based on relatively strong assumptions. Factors such as credit restrictions, imperfect financial markets and the fact that consumers are not always prudent may lead to increased propensity to consume. Whether temporary or permanent changes in fiscal policy involve the largest multipliers depends on the type of fiscal measures. Measures that affect private incomes, such as tax cuts, generally have the greatest impact if they are permanent and do not lead to uncertainty about fiscal sustainability. On the other hand, measures that affect the price level, such as reductions of indirect taxes, have the greatest impact if they are temporary, as temporarily lower prices are likely to have a positive effect on consumption. The effect of a temporary reduction of indirect taxes depends on the degree to which the tax cut ultimately affects consumer prices. Empirical literature contains a large number of studies estimating the size of fiscal multipliers1. The results vary considerably across studies, one reason being the use of different multiplier estimation methods. The multipliers are typically estimated by means of simulations of macroeconomic models or by empirical studies such as structural VAR models or case studies. A con siderable challenge in relation to the empirical studies is to separate discretionary fiscal policy from the cyclical development of public finances. It may be particularly difficult to measure the multipliers in an economic downturn, as many different factors affect the economic development. Most studies focus on the USA, Japan and the large European countries. The estimates vary across countries, yet it is possible to draw a few general conclusions from the empirical studies. First of all, though small, the multiplier estimates are generally positive. The estimates show that in the short term increased public consumption or investment generally has a greater impact than tax cuts or transfers. While increased public consumption or investment affects demand directly, relaxation measures that increase private disposable income are dependent on the extent to which consumers choose to save up the extra income. The effect is not necessarily smaller in the long term, as consumers may gradually choose to spend the extra income. A greater impact can be achieved by targeting the relaxation measures at consumers who have limited access to credit and at low-income groups, which often have the greatest propensity to consume. Despite considerable variation in empiric results, there is generally not much empirical evidence that the impact of fiscal policy is crowded out by interest-rate increases or appreciation of the currency. Equally, the empirical studies support Ricardian equivalence only to a minor degree. |
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Furthermore, the effect is not just dependent on the size, but also on the composition of the fiscal stimulus measures. Most empirical studies show that increased public investment and increased public consump tion have a greater short-term effect on economic activity than tax cuts, while in the longer term, tax cuts may well have a greater impact.
The assessment of the potential impact of fiscal policy during the current economic and financial crisis should take into account the possi bility that the size of the fiscal multipliers may have changed in relation to the multipliers estimated in more "normal" times when the financial markets in particular functioned better. On the one hand, the financial crisis may have limited access to credit for households and the corpor ate sector, which may cause them to spend a higher share of their income. The prospect of low inflation and large negative output gaps may also create an expectation of low interest rates for a extended period4 causing long-term interest rates to rise relatively less under an expansionary fiscal policy. This may reduce the crowding out of private investments. On the other hand, the heightened uncertainty about em ployment and income may cause households to reduce their debts or increase their savings, meaning that the expansionary fiscal policy has a lower impact on economic activity than indicated by previously esti mated multipliers. The same may apply to business enterprises that choose to postpone investment decisions due to increased uncertainty about the economic outlook.
The stabilising effect of fiscal policy during the crisis also depends on the fiscal scope of individual countries. In countries with rapidly in creasing government debt and where fiscal sustainability is under pres sure, the private sector may tend to save up more, which will dampen the stimulating effect of fiscal policy on the economy. In the same way, a higher level of government debt may lead to higher interest rates or a wider interest-rate spread in individual countries through a higher risk premium. This could also dampen overall demand.
Composition of fiscal policy during the crisis
To ensure the greatest possible effect of fiscal measures during the crisis, these measures should be timely and targeted. It is crucial that the fiscal measures are implemented in time to ensure that they dampen the crisis while it is at its worst. If they are not implemented until the economy has begun to pick up, they may have a destabilising effect. In addition, such measures are most effective if aimed directly at economic problems that have arisen during the crisis. In order to reduce the deterioration of fiscal sustainability, the measures should also be of a temporary nature so as to allow fiscal policy to be tightened again once the crisis is over. While timely, targeted and temporary fiscal measures have the most beneficial effect on the economy, their composition may be restricted by both political and practical considerations. Most of the fiscal measures im plemented by OECD countries during the crisis have been in the form of tax cuts, cf. Chart 4 showing the composition of fiscal policy from 2008 to 2010, even though the impact of tax cuts is highly dependent on the propensity to consume, which may have declined during the crisis. The reason may very well be that it is easier to implement tax cuts than to increase public investment, for example. The tax cuts have generally been aimed at the entire population. Such tax cuts are typically easier to implement politically than tax cuts aimed at specific population groups. The economic impact would probably have been greater if they had been aimed at low-income groups with a higher propensity to consume. Another drawback of tax cuts may be that it is politically difficult to raise taxes again once the crisis is over. Permanent tax cuts may thus have a negative impact on the long-term sustainability of public finances.
| COMPOSITION OF FISCAL POLICY 2008-10 | Chart 4 |
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| Note: OECD calculation of the composition of the fiscal measures across countries. The shares indicate how much a given fiscal relaxation measure constitutes of the total relaxation. Relaxation measures have been summed across countries. Only countries easing their fiscal policies in 2008-10 have been included. Source: OECD, Economic Outlook, No. 85, June 2009. |
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In addition to substantial tax cuts, many countries have announced increased public investments. The advantage of bringing forward public investments is that they stimulate demand directly, and that they are of a temporary nature and therefore will not have a permanent negative impact on fiscal sustainability. As public investments often stimulate in dividual subsectors of the economy, investments that distort competition or lead to bottlenecks in the economy should be avoided. One drawback of increasing public investments is that such measures cannot be introduced as fast as e.g. tax cuts. While politicians may quickly decide to increase e.g. infrastructure investments, it takes some time to imple ment the decision. The stimulation of the economy may thus come too late.
It is still too early to see the effects of the many fiscal measures taken during the current crisis. Many of the measures taken in the EU will not be implemented until the 2nd half of 2009, one exception being the attempt to boost car sales in Germany by giving owners of older cars subsidies to buy a new car. Car sales have increased substantially since the initiative was launched, but presumably the effect is only temporary. On the other hand, the temporary tax cuts and one-off transfer pay ments implemented in the USA in 2008 and 2009 have had no significant effect on household consumption, cf. Chart 5. Instead, a clear impact can be seen on the private savings ratio. These measures aimed at private disposable incomes in the USA were implemented quickly and might potentially have increased private demand at a time when the economy was the most severely affected. The prioritisation of savings over higher consumption may have to do with the fact that the measures only tem porarily increase private disposable incomes. Furthermore, the higher unemployment rate may very well lead to uncertainty about future in come, thereby increasing the savings ratio.
| DISPOSABLE INCOME, PRIVATE CONSUMPTION AND SAVINGS RATIO, USA | Chart 5 |
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| Source: Reuters EcoWin. | |
In Denmark the fiscal relaxation will be more or less equally dis tributed on the revenue and expenditure side in 2009 and 2010. Income taxes will be eased in both 2009 and 2010, while local-government investments that have been brought forward and increased transport investments also increase public investments. It should be noted that the tax cuts were implemented with a view to increasing the labour supply and thus may also have a structurally beneficial effect. As the tax cuts are underfinanced in the short term, but fully financed in the longer term, they may have a positive impact on economic activity during the crisis without jeopardising long-term sustainability, but the impact of the tax cuts is determined by whether households choose to save up or to consume the extra disposable income. Public investments in 2009 and 2010 will have a more direct impact on economic activity than tax cuts. Bringing forward public investments that would have been imple mented in any case within the next few years eases fiscal policy tempor arily without having a permanent negative impact on public finances. The impact of the increase in investments depends on the local govern ments' implementation of the increased fixed investments, however, in cluding how soon the initiatives can be launched. The pool of kr. 1.5 billion earmarked for renovation of private housing is aimed at strengthening employment in the building and construction sector. Ac cording to a questionnaire survey conducted by the Danish Enterprise and Construction Authority5 the pool has only to a limited extent caused Danish homeowners to carry out improvements they would not other wise have carried out. On the other hand, the pool did accelerate the projects of the majority of applicants.
The special pension savings disbursement option does not really constitute active fiscal policy as it just gives Danes the option of prema ture withdrawal of special pension funds. Unlike the other measures, the scheme improves public finances in the short term by bringing forward tax revenue. The scheme runs from June to December 2009, and in early August more than 80 per cent of the total special pension funds had already been disbursed. Retail sales, which had fallen in the 1st quarter of 2009, showed an increase of 1 per cent from June to July, possibly facilitated by the disbursement of the special pension funds.
Future fiscal policy
The need and scope for further fiscal loosening vary considerably from country to country. First of all there is uncertainty about the economic development, which leads to a risk of easing fiscal policy when the econ omy has reversed. Furthermore, the substantial deterioration of public finances and the growing debt burden limit the fiscal room for man oeuvre in many countries. It is important not to jeopardise fiscal sustain ability and to consolidate public finances in the medium term. Speedy consolidation is especially important in countries where public finances will come under pressure in the coming years as a result of growing demographic challenges. According to the European Commission's latest estimate6 , in 2010 only four out of 27 EU member states are expected to observe the Stability and Growth Pact's limit for general-government deficits, i.e. 3 per cent of GDP. In addition, many member states are far from meeting their medium-term objectives for the structural balance. Substantial consolidation is therefore needed in the near future within the EU.
[1] Jan Overgaard Olesen and Ann-Louise Winther, Automatic Stabilisers, Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 1st Quarter 2009.
[2] The calculations are based on the estimated activity multipliers. The greater the share of the underlying shock that is attributable to private consumption, the greater the activity effect of the automatic stabilisers will be, while a larger share that is attributable to exports reduces the effect.
[3]The distribution indicates the relation between the change in the structural balance, cf. Economic Survey, August 2009, and the change in the government budget balance, cf. the article The Danish Economy 2009-11, p. 33.
[4]Cf. a speech by Donald L. Kohn at the Conference on Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions, Expect ations, and Dynamics in the Current Economic Crisis, Princeton University, May 2009.
[5]Effect of the renovation pool – results of an interview survey (in Danish only), June 2009.
[6] Public Finances in EMU, the European Commission 2009.
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