|
Risk Management
Operational riskCash supply The final decision concerning a new cash-handling system is expected to be taken in the 1st half of 2010. Danmarks Nationalbank and the Danish Bankers Association have also initiated the preparation of new industry standards regarding security features for cash centres and cash transports in Denmark. The security standards are to be developed by Danish Standards, with input from all players and stakeholders involved in the supply of cash. This is in accordance with the general rules for development of standards in Denmark. The security standards are expected to be ready some time during 2010, so that, after a transitional period, it can be used as a foundation for cash-supply contracts. Business continuity
Financial riskDanmarks Nationalbank is exposed to a number of financial risks. Some of them arise from its role as monetary authority, while others reflect how Danmarks Nationalbank, in its capacity as a financial enterprise, takes on risk in the expectation of reaping a reward to match the risk. The choice of risk level is characterised by prudence. Danmarks Nationalbank is exposed to market risks such as interest-rate, gold and foreign-exchange risks as well as liquidity and credit risks. During the year, the foreign-exchange reserve grew by kr. 183 billion to kr. 395 billion. Management of Danmarks Nationalbank's portfolios reflected the wish to place the funds at an acceptable level of risk. If the foreign-exchange reserve increases, the funds are normally placed as collateralised bank deposits, but in 2009 part of the increase was invested in government bonds with high credit ratings. In early 2009, there was still turmoil in the money market, and many counterparties were downgraded. As the year progressed, the financial markets calmed down. In many countries, monetary policies remained unusually accommodative, resulting in very low short-term interest rates. Since most of Danmarks Nationalbank's portfolio is invested short-term, current income from such investments was low. Increasing risk appetite and an improved economic outlook caused both country and credit spreads to narrow to the level observed before the autumn of 2008. This had a positive impact on the value of Danmarks Nationalbank's portfolio of credit-sensitive bonds such as mortgage-credit bonds, covered bonds and certain government bonds. The value of Danmarks Nationalbank's stock of gold, 66.5 tonnes, rose considerably. Market risk Interest-rate exposure At end-2009 the interest-rate exposure was kr. 1.9 billion, cf. Table 4. Consequently, an increase by 1 percentage point in interest rates would entail a loss of kr. 1.9 billion due to price fluctuations. The increase of kr. 0.4 billion relative to end-2008 is attributable to factors such as Danmarks Nationalbank's decision to increase its portfolio of government bonds issued by euro area member states as a result of the increase in the foreign-exchange reserve.
The interest-rate exposure of the domestic securities portfolio remained unchanged in 2009. Gold exposure The price of gold has been rising in recent years, a trend that continued into 2009, cf. Chart 3. In Danish kroner, the price of gold increased by more than 25 per cent in 2009. Consequently, the market value of the gold stock rose by kr. 2.5 billion to kr. 12.3 billion, leading to an equivalent increase in the exposure to the price of gold.
Foreign-exchange exposure
Danmarks Nationalbank converts most of its foreign-exchange exposure in non-euro currencies to euro by means of forward contracts. The net result is an exposure in euro and a small exposure in dollars. At the end of 2009, the foreign-exchange exposure was kr. 384.6 billion, cf. Table 5. Danmarks Nationalbank will thus incur a loss of just over kr. 3.8 billion if the krone strengthens by 1 per cent. The foreign-exchange exposure had increased by kr. 164.6 billion from the end of 2008, reflecting the larger foreign-exchange reserve. The increase was solely in euro. Due to the fixed-exchange-rate policy, fluctuations against the euro are small, and hence the foreign-exchange risk is limited.
Value-at-Risk At the close of 2009, Danmarks Nationalbank's VaR was kr. 4.2 billion, which is kr. 1.6 billion lower than at the beginning of the year, cf. Chart 4. VaR fell despite the fact that the interest-rate, gold and exchange-rate exposures all increased. The reason was that markets were calmer in 2009 than in the autumn of 2008.
VaR is a widely used risk measure, but it has its limitations. Since VaR is based on the most recent period, it is strongly influenced by market developments in that period. For example, if volatility estimates are based on observations from the autumn of 2008, VaR for Danmarks Nationalbank's exposure at end-2009 will be kr. 8.4 billion, which is twice as high at the VaR calculated on the basis of observations from the most recent period. Thus VaR does not give any indication of the losses if the markets once again become very turbulent. Hence, VaR should not be the only risk measure applied. Stress tests In the most severe stress scenario, the loss to Danmarks Nationalbank will be just over kr. 26 billion. Such a loss will be caused by a significant drop in the gold price, coinciding with considerable appreciation of the krone and substantial interest-rate increases in the US and European markets. The loss resulting from this stress scenario is almost kr. 8 billion higher than at end-2008, reflecting the increased exposure to all three risk factors. Liquidity risk
The autumn of 2008 saw very substantial drawings on Danmarks Nationalbank's foreign-exchange reserve, emphasising the need to maintain a liquid reserve of a certain size. In 2009, Danmarks Nationalbank enhanced the requirements for contingency liquidity, inter alia, by increasing investments in collateralised short-term bank deposits. Credit risk Danmarks Nationalbank seeks to limit its credit risk by requiring that counterparties have high credit ratings, and by spreading its assets over many counterparties. In addition, investments with counterparty banks are to a large extent subject to provision of collateral. The collateral, virtually only government bonds, must be high-quality assets. Danmarks Nationalbank is entitled to sell the collateral if a counterparty fails, thereby covering its losses. This was exactly what happened when Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 in September 2008. Danmarks Nationalbank had a deposit against government securities as collateral. These were sold immediately after the bankruptcy, and Danmarks National bank did not suffer any losses. None of Danmarks National bank's counterparties failed in 2009. In the course of the year, Danmarks Nationalbank introduced new internal rules for approval of counterparty banks. The rules are based on the international rating agencies' long-term ratings, which take into account how the option of government support impacts on the credit risk on bank deposits. This should be seen in the light of experience from the crisis, which showed that systemically important banks were rescued more often than not. Credit exposure The credit exposure increased in 2009, cf. Table 6. The reason is that the foreign-exchange reserve grew, entailing more investments, both in the money market and in bonds. At the close of the year, 81 per cent of Danmarks Nationalbank's portfolio was invested in category Aa3 or higher.
The exposure to supranational institutions with no rating comprises the IMF, among others. In 2009, the IMF's drawing rights increased by kr. 36.3 billion to kr. 55.6 billion, of which kr. 3.3 billion had been exercised at year-end.1 The risk on this exposure is assessed to be small. The credit spread exposure indicates how much Danmarks National bank will lose if the credit spread vis-à-vis a certain counterparty widens by 1 percentage point. It is thus equivalent to the interest-rate exposure on an individual counterparty. Danmarks Nationalbank's interest-rate exposure increased in 2009, but primarily versus governments with the highest possible credit rating. Hence the risk that spreads will widen considerably is assessed to be low. 1 For a more detailed discussion of Danmarks Nationalbank's accounts with the IMF, see Thomas Krabbe Jensen and Søren Vester Sørensen, Danmarks Nationalbank's Financial Accounts with the International Monetary Fund, IMF, Danmarks Nationalbank, Monetary Review, 4th Quarter 2009. |
|
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||