Banking Panic Risk and Macroeconomic Uncertainty

Jakob Guldbæk Mikkelsen
jgm@nationalbanken.dk

Johannes Poeschl
jpo@nationalbanken.dk

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Resume

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E44; G12; G21; G28

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The authors alone are responsible for any remaining errors.
Banking Panic Risk and Macroeconomic Uncertainty*

Jakob G. Mikkelsen    Johannes Poeschl

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*Mikkelsen: Financial Stability Department, Danmarks Nationalbank, jgm@nationalbanken.dk and Poeschl: Research Department, Danmarks Nationalbank, jpo@nationalbanken.dk. Corresponding author: Johannes Poeschl. The authors thank Federico Ravenna, Luca Dedola, Raffaele Rossi, Kjetil Storesletten, Juan Rubio-Ramirez and seminar participants at Danmarks Nationalbank for comments. The viewpoints and conclusions stated are the responsibility of the individual contributors, and do not necessarily reflect the views of Danmarks Nationalbank.
1 Introduction

In this paper, we study how systemic risk in the banking sector affects the real economy through a novel feedback loop between systemic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty and explore how macroprudential policy can help to dampen this negative feedback loop.

The financial crisis of 2007-2009 was associated with a significant rise in both systemic risk in the banking sector and macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly: Fears of a systemic banking panic resulting in a disastrous breakdown of the financial sector were widespread. Measures of systemic risk in the banking sector increased substantially. In the first panel of Figure 1, we show the TED spread, which proxies the funding costs of the US banking sector and is thus a good indicator of systemic risk. The TED spread is usually close to zero, but increased almost tenfold from 0.38 in January 2007 to 2.45 in October 2008. This represented a substantial and unprecedented increase in systemic risk. At the same time, uncertainty in financial markets, which we proxy by the VIX in the second panel, increased dramatically to equally unprecedented levels.

This uncertainty spilled over into the aggregate economy: Measures of broader financial and macroeconomic uncertainty spiked, too. Consider for example the real uncertainty index constructed by Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). We show it in the third panel of Figure 1. This index measures the conditional volatility in an exhaustive set of macroeconomic time series. During the financial crisis, it increased by about a third. As we show in the last three panels of Figure 1, credit risk premia spiked, and investment and output plummeted.

As a consequence of this disastrous event, the US and many other countries introduced a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB) for banks as a new policy instrument. One of the stated purposes of such a policy is to reduce systemic risk in the economy by curbing excessive credit booms which can lead to severe downturns when they end. However, the exact macroeconomic effects of this policy, in particular in a regime with elevated systemic risk, remain the subject of an ongoing debate.

These observations lead us to our research questions: How does an increase in systemic risk in the banking sector relate to an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly? What are the implications of endogenous systemic risk for business cycle dynamics and asset

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1See e.g. https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/pressreleases/bcreg20160908b.htm for the US.

2See e.g. Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2010), page 7, paragraph 29: As witnessed during the financial crisis, losses incurred in the banking sector during a downturn preceded by a period of excess credit growth can be extremely large. Such losses can destabilise the banking sector, which can bring about or exacerbate a downturn in the real economy. This in turn can further destabilise the banking sector. These interlinkages highlight the particular importance of the banking sector building up its capital defences in periods when credit has grown to excessive levels. The building up of these defences should have the additional benefit of helping to moderate excess credit growth.
Figure 1: Measures of systemic risk (TED spread), aggregate uncertainty (VIX and Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015)-Index), credit spreads, investment and real GDP.

Note: Sample period: 2006Q1 to 2013Q4. The TED spread is the 3-month LIBOR minus the 3-month US treasury rate. The macroeconomic uncertainty index, which measures real uncertainty, is taken from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), available at https://www.sydneyludvigson.com/data-and-appendixes. We use uncertainty at the 3-month horizon. The credit spread is the Moody’s BAA yield minus the federal funds rate. Real investment and output are detrended using the CBO potential output estimate.
prices? And how does the interaction between systemic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty affect the desirability of macroprudential policy?

To tackle these questions, we develop a simple, quantitative model of a production economy with a financial sector. The key feature of the model is that disastrous banking panics can occur with an endogenous probability. It is based on the work by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a): Households lend to banks, which in turn lend to firms. Firms use these loans to make investments. Due to a moral hazard problem in the spirit of Gertler and Karadi (2011), banks face an incentive constraint that limits their borrowing to a time-varying multiple of their equity. We interpret this incentive constraint as a market-imposed capital requirement. Crucially, the incentive constraint implies that a bank with zero or negative net worth cannot operate and must default. Together with the result that asset prices are increasing in bank net worth, the possibility of default implies that banks face systemic and self-fulfilling rollover crises in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015). We follow Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a) in calling these events banking panics. A banking panic of that kind occurs, when expectations about a banking panic drive down the values of banks’ assets so much that their net worth becomes negative. Banking panics are disastrous events, resulting in a large increase in credit spreads as well as a contraction of output, consumption and investment. We show that the dynamics of a banking panic in the model match the dynamics of asset prices and macroeconomic aggregates during the Great Recession in the United States well. Banking panics arise with an endogenous, time-varying probability. We define the probability of such a banking panic as systemic risk, using the terms banking panic risk and systemic risk interchangeably.

Our first main result is that an increase in systemic risk leads to an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty, i.e. in the VIX and the conditional volatility of output. The model therefore provides a tight link between systemic risk in the financial sector and more broadly defined macroeconomic uncertainty. To our knowledge, making this link explicit and studying its implications in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model is a novel contribution to the literature. Systemic risk increases the conditional volatility of the economy, because the probability of a banking panic is endogenous and highly state-dependent. Since the probability of a banking panic in a state with a good realization of the exogenous shock is unchanged, output in those states is unaffected. In states of the world with a bad realization of the exogenous shock, the possibility of a banking panic increases the range of bad outcomes. Therefore, the presence of banking panic risk widens the conditional distribution of output by creating downside risk. Our results are consistent with the empirical results reported in Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019), who report that during times of
financial stress, the conditional distribution of GDP in the US has higher downside risk. Moreover, the empirical evidence in Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) also provides strong support for the channel we emphasize by showing that an increase in systemic risk predicts a higher likelihood of a low realization of output.

For our second main result, we investigate the importance of this banking panic-driven uncertainty for macroeconomic dynamics. We find that banking panic-driven uncertainty is a novel channel that amplifies the response of the economy to a shock and increases the unconditional volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices. We arrive at this result by comparing an economy with endogenous banking panic risk to an economy without banking panics. Crucially, in the model without banking panics, banks otherwise face the same financial constraints as in our baseline model with banking panics. The transmission mechanism through which banking panic-driven uncertainty amplifies shocks works through a precautionary savings channel, a credit spread channel and a bank leverage channel: A negative macroeconomic shock increases the likelihood of a banking panic. Macroeconomic uncertainty about future consumption increases. As a consequence, the returns on risk-free assets fall as savers increase their demand for savings, seeking to insure themselves against future uncertainty. This is the precautionary savings channel. The returns on risky assets increase, as risk-averse investors demand higher risk premia. Higher risk premia in turn lead to a higher required return on investment for the non-financial sector and hence lower investment and output. This is the credit spread channel. Moreover, the moral hazard problem ties the borrowing capacity of banks to the market value of their net worth. As bank net worth is a risky asset, the return on banks’ net worth increases, implying that the market price of banks’ net worth falls. Banks are forced to contract lending, which increases the required return on investment for the non-financial sector. Output and investment fall. This is the bank leverage channel. Quantitatively, the bank leverage channel turns out to be the most important in our calibration, while the precautionary savings channel and the credit spread channel play a lesser role.

As our third main result, we investigate the importance of this novel banking panic uncertainty channel for macroprudential policy benefits. We focus on a dynamic capital requirement policy that the regulator sets to dampen credit booms, which lead to an excess build-up of systemic risk. In particular, we investigate the contributions of banking panics and systemic risk to the welfare effects of a policy that seeks to offset the feedback loop between asset prices, bank balance sheets and investment, i.e. the so-called financial accelerator effect (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999)). Such a policy is desirable, because it enables the regulator to correct for the fact that banks fail to internalize that their lending decisions, through asset prices, affect the likelihood of a banking panic. There is therefore
a pecuniary externality in the model. Banking panics are inefficient, because they arise as a coordination of the agents on the dominated panic equilibrium. This equilibrium is dominated, because relative to the good no-panic equilibrium, lending to the non-financial sector is not undertaken by the most efficient lenders, i.e. the banks. When we again compare the two models with and without banking panic uncertainty, we find that there is a new benefit from this policy in the model with banking panic-driven uncertainty, since dampening the financial accelerator also reduces the likelihood of a banking panic, which lowers uncertainty. Put bluntly, we show that macroprudential policy is more beneficial in a regime with elevated systemic risk in the banking sector.

**Literature**  Our model builds on recent work by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a). Relative to these authors, we focus on the effects of banking panic risk on macroeconomic uncertainty and highlight the importance of this uncertainty channel. There are two key differences between our model and theirs: First, banking crises in our model are persistent, which helps us to account for the slow recovery after the financial crisis, and second, households have recursive Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) preferences, which allows us to calibrate the model using asset pricing data.\(^3\) Our focus on the uncertainty channel is similar to Navarro (2014), who does not model endogenous financial crises, however.

More generally, our paper is at the intersection of the literature on financial crises in macroeconomic models and the literature on the effects of uncertainty on business cycles. We contribute to this literature by highlighting the effect of uncertainty that results from the possibility of banking panics as a new channel through which financial crises can affect macroeconomic dynamics. We argue that the macroeconomic uncertainty caused by the spike in systemic risk is an important feedback channel that amplifies the severity of financial crises. There are now many macroeconomic models of financial crises: Our paper belongs to a strand of the literature that models financial crises as rollover crises in the spirit of Calvo (1988) and Cole and Kehoe (2000), e.g. Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), Paul (2018), and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a). Relative to these papers, ours is the only one about a real production economy with fully endogenous and anticipated banking panics. Other papers model financial crises as a financial constraint of a leveraged agent becoming binding, e.g. Mendoza (2010), Bianchi (2011), He and Krishnamurthy (2012), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014) and Akinci and Queralto (2017).

\(^3\)The use of EZ preferences to match asset prices is common in the macro-finance literature, see e.g. Van Binsbergen, Fernández-Villaverde, Koijen, and Rubio-Ramírez (2012) or Rudebusch and Swanson (2012).
Due to this focus on macroeconomic uncertainty, our paper also naturally connects to the macroeconomic literature on the effects of macroeconomic uncertainty on macroeconomic dynamics. Relative to the former literature, we first present banking panic risk as a novel channel through which macroeconomic uncertainty can arise endogenously. Second, we study how uncertainty feeds back into amplifying systemic risk. Third, we show that an increase in uncertainty due to banking panic risk is not symmetric, but concentrated in the left tail of the output distribution. In general, this literature focuses on exogenous, symmetric uncertainty shocks, e.g. Born and Pfeifer (2014), Fernández-Villaverde, Guerrón-Quintana, Kuester, and Rubio-Ramírez (2015), Leduc and Liu (2016) and Basu and Bundick (2017). Others, e.g. Fajgelbaum, Schaal, and Taschereau-Dumouchel (2017) or Cacciarelli and Ravenna (2018) present mechanisms in which uncertainty arises endogenously or in which exogenous uncertainty shocks get endogenously amplified. The idea that small probabilities of large disasters can have big consequences for asset prices and macroeconomic dynamics has been explored, in a model with exogenous disasters, in Barro (2009) and Gourio (2012). Banking panics in our model can be interpreted as a particular kind of disaster that arises with an endogenous probability. Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019) and Alessandri and Mumtaz (2019) present empirical evidence that financial stress and macroeconomic uncertainty are connected.

The paper is lastly related to the literature on the macroeconomic effects of bank regulation, in particular dynamic capital requirements. We study endogenous banking panic-driven uncertainty as a novel channel which affects the desirability of dynamic capital requirements. The macroeconomic effects of static capital requirements have been studied for example in Angeloni and Faia (2013), Begenau and Landvoigt (2018) or Begenau (2019). Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012) discuss dynamic capital requirements in a model with exogenous disasters. Faria-e Castro (2019) investigates the macroeconomic effects of countercyclical capital buffers on banking panics, but does not focus on the uncertainty channel. Gersbach and Rochet (2017) study countercyclical capital buffers in an economy in which pecuniary externalities lead banks to lend excessively, which causes misallocation.

Outline We proceed as follows: In section 2, we introduce the model. We characterize the equilibrium and formalize banking panic risk in section 3. We calibrate the model in section 4. In section 5, we show what a typical banking panic in the model looks like. We explain how banking panic risk affects macroeconomic uncertainty, and how macroeconomic uncertainty in turn feeds back into the economy in section 6. In section 7, we discuss macroprudential regulation. Finally, section 8 concludes.
2 Model

The model is a simple, stylized production economy with a financial sector, based on Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a). The key feature of the model is that financial frictions in the banking sector can lead to self-fulfilling rollover crises for banks in the spirit of Calvo (1988), Cole and Kehoe (2000) and Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015).

There are many households which each consist of a measure $f$ of workers and a measure $1-f$ of bankers. Within each household, there is perfect consumption risk sharing. The households own and operate firms which produce consumption goods, firms which produce investment goods, and mutual funds. Workers supply a unit of labor in fixed supply, make loans to consumption goods producers and deposits to banks. Bankers own and operate banks. They use debt and their net worth to make loans to consumption goods producers. Banks accumulate retained earnings until they exit the economy with exogenous probability. In that case, they transfer the retained earnings as dividend income to their household. A moral hazard problem limits the ability of banks to issue debt to a time-varying multiple of their net worth, i.e. their leverage. Consumption goods producers own the capital stock, and use capital and labor to produce consumption goods. Investment goods producers transform consumption goods into investment goods using a technology which has decreasing returns to scale in the short run due to investment adjustment costs. Finally, mutual funds manage the portfolio of loans to consumption goods producers made directly by households against a fee. We begin by describing the non-standard part of the model, i.e. the household and banking sectors. We follow the convention that lower case letters for variables denote individual variables, while upper case letters denote aggregate variables.

2.1 Households

Preferences Households maximize utility from consumption. Their utility function $V_t^H$ is given by Epstein and Zin (1989) preferences, which are defined recursively as:

$$V_t^H = \left( (1 - \beta) (c_t^H)^{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (V_{t+1}^H)^{1-\gamma} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\gamma}} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\sigma}},$$

(2.1)

where $\mathbb{E}_t$ denotes the expectation conditional on time $t$ information and $\beta$ is the discount factor of the household. $c_t^H$ denotes household consumption in period $t$. $\gamma$ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, $\sigma$ the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution of the household. These preferences imply that the stochastic discount factor of the household is
given by
\[ \Lambda_{t,t+1} = \beta \left( \frac{c_{t+1}^H}{c_t^H} \right)^{-\sigma} \left( \frac{V_{t+1}^H}{\mathbb{E}_t \left[ (V_{t+1}^H)^{1-\gamma} \right]} \right)^{\sigma-\gamma}. \] (2.2)

With \( \sigma = \gamma \), this preference specification collapses to constant relative risk aversion preferences. \( \gamma > \sigma \) implies that households have a preference for early resolution of uncertainty.

**Budget constraint**  Workers consume, make state-contingent long-term loans to consumption goods producers \( a_{t+1}^H \) through mutual funds and hold non-state-contingent one-period debt \( d_{t+1}^H \) issued by banks. They also have access to a risk-free one-period bond \( b_{t+1}^H \), which is in zero net supply. We introduce this bond to ensure that the concept of a risk-free interest rate is well-defined.\(^4\) Since loans to consumption goods producers are effectively claims on the capital stock of those firms, they are valued at the market price of capital \( Q_t \). The investments of workers into firms are managed by mutual funds, which charge a capital management fee \( f_t \). Workers supply one unit of labor inelastically and receive wages \( W_t \) as labor income.\(^5\) They receive profits \( \Pi_t \) of firms and banks. Loans to banks yield a return \( \tilde{R}_{t+1}^D \) in the subsequent period. Loans to firms pay a return \( R_{t+1}^A \). The budget constraint of the household is given by
\[ c_t^H + (Q_t + f_t) a_{t+1}^H + b_{t+1}^H + d_{t+1}^H = R_{t+1}^A a_{t}^H + \tilde{R}_{t}^D d_{t}^H + R_{t+1}^B b_{t}^H + W_t + \Pi_t. \] (2.3)

### 2.2 Banks

#### 2.2.1 Setup

**Objective function**  Banks are operated by bankers. They maximize
\[ V_t^B = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} (1 - p_{t+1}) \left[ \eta n_{t+1}^B + (1 - \eta) V_{t+1}^B \right], \] (2.4)

where \( \Lambda_{t,t+1} \) is the stochastic discount factor of households from period \( t \) to \( t + 1 \), \( \eta \) is a probability that the bank exits the economy, \( p_t \) is the probability that the bank defaults in period \( t \) and \( n_t^B \) is the net worth of the bank at the beginning of period \( t \).

**Entry and exit**  As in Gertler and Karadi (2011), we assume that with probability \( \eta \), a banker will be forced to give up his bank, sell its assets, repay its liabilities and pay the net

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\(^4\)Bank debt carries some default risk.

\(^5\)To keep the model as simple as possible, we model labor supply as constant. Endogenizing the labor supply choice is straightforward and would not substantially affect the results.
worth to households. We introduce this assumption to ensure that banks will not outsave their borrowing constraints. To keep the mass of bankers constant, an equal mass of workers will start operating a bank with start-up funding $n_{t}^{B,\text{new}}$. This start-up funding is given by a fraction $\nu$ of the total assets traded in the economy: $n_{t}^{B,\text{new}} = \nu A_{t}$.

**Net worth** Banks issue debt $d_{t+1}^{B}$. They make loans to consumption good producers $a_{t+1}^{B}$, who use these loans to purchase capital. Since there are no financial frictions between the firms and banks, these loans can be understood as direct claims on the capital stock of firms.\footnote{This is obviously a modeling shortcut to make bank balance sheets responsive to current market prices. Another way to introduce state-contingency into bank balance sheets is through defaultable long-term debt, e.g. as in Ferrante (2018).}

In period $t$, incumbent banks obtain a gross return on loans, $R_{t}^{A}a_{t}^{B}$. They pay a return $R_{t}^{D}d_{t}^{B}$ to households on their debt. An incumbent bank’s net worth at the beginning of period $t$ is given by the return on equity times the equity invested in the last period:

$$R_{t}^{E}n_{t-1} = R_{t}^{A}a_{t}^{B} - R_{t}^{D}d_{t}^{B}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.5)

Banks will optimally accumulate net worth until they exit the economy. Hence, equity at the end of the current period is equal to the banks’ net worth: $n_{t} = R_{t}^{E}n_{t-1}$. Since we focus on the macroeconomic dynamics in the short run, we assume that banks cannot issue additional equity. It is a common assumption in the literature that equity issuance carries at least some cost for banks, see e.g. Akinci and Queralto (2017), Begnau (2019) or Corbae and D’Erasmo (2018). Hence, the equity of banks corresponds to their net worth.

**Balance sheet** The balance sheet constraint of banks states that assets $Q_{t}a_{t+1}^{B}$ equal liabilities $d_{t+1}^{B}$ plus equity $n_{t}^{B}$:

$$Q_{t}a_{t+1}^{B} = d_{t+1}^{B} + n_{t}^{B}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.6)

We define the leverage of a bank $\phi_{t}^{B}$ as the value of its assets divided by the value of its equity:

$$\phi_{t}^{B} \equiv \frac{Q_{t}a_{t+1}^{B}}{n_{t}^{B}}.$$  \hspace{1cm} (2.7)

**Moral hazard problem** To motivate the existence of a market-imposed capital requirement, we introduce the following moral hazard problem: banks can divert a fraction of their assets after they have made their borrowing and lending decisions. In particular, a fraction $\psi$, $0 < \psi < 1$ of their loans to firms can be diverted by the banker for personal consumption.
If bankers divert assets, they will not repay their liabilities. Their creditors, i.e. the workers of other households, will force the banks to exit the economy if they observe diversion. The owner of the bank will return to being a worker. Because diversion occurs at the end of the period before next-period uncertainty realizes, an incentive constraint on the banks can ensure that diversion will never occur in equilibrium. This incentive constraint states that the benefit of diversion must be smaller or equal to the continuation value of the bank:

$$\psi Q_t a_{t+1}^B \leq V_t^B$$

(2.8)

Dividing by net worth and defining $$\Omega_t^B \equiv V_t^B / n_t^B$$, we can see that 2.8 corresponds to a market-imposed leverage constraint:

$$\phi_t^B \leq \frac{1}{\psi} \Omega_t^B.$$  

(2.9)

**Regulation**  The regulator follows a dynamic policy, which corresponds to a countercyclical capital buffer. We model this policy as an upper bound on leverage:

$$\phi_t^B \leq \bar{\phi}_t^B,$$  

(2.10)

$$\ln \bar{\phi}_t^B = \ln \bar{\phi}_t^B - \tau (\ln N_t^B - \ln N^B).$$

(2.11)

For $$\tau > 0$$, this formulation implies that the regulator tightens the leverage constraint whenever net worth of the aggregate banking sector $$N_t^B$$ is higher than its net worth in the stochastic steady state $$N^B$$, with elasticity $$\tau$$. ln denotes the natural logarithm.

**2.2.2 Optimality**

**Default**  We show in the appendix that the franchise value of operating a bank which does not receive an exit shock in period $$t$$, $$V_t^B$$, is linear in the net worth of the bank:

**Proposition 2.1.** The value function of the bank is linear in its net worth: $$V_t^B = \Omega_t^B n_t^B$$, where $$\Omega_t^B > 0$$ only depends on the aggregate state of the economy, but not on bank-specific variables.

With this, we can show that the incentive constraint 2.8 of the bank implies a borrowing
limit is linear in its net worth:

\[ d_{t+1}^B \leq \frac{\Phi_t}{1 - \Phi_t} r_t^B, \quad (2.12) \]

\[ \Phi_t = \frac{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} (\eta + (1 - \eta) \Omega_{t+1}) R_{t+1}^A}{E_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} (\eta + (1 - \eta) \Omega_{t+1}) R_{t+1}^D}. \]

This implies that creditors are not willing to lend to the bank, when the net worth of the bank is negative. Moreover, negative net worth means by definition that the bank cannot repay its liabilities and is insolvent. Therefore, when

\[ R_t^A a_t^B \leq R_t^D d_t^B, \quad (2.13) \]

the bank will default. The creditors of the bank, which are the workers of other households than the household the bank belongs to, will liquidate the assets of the bank.\(^7\) The recovery rate on their debt is given by

\[ x_t^D = \frac{R_t^A a_t^B}{R_t^D d_t^B}. \quad (2.14) \]

The return on deposits that households receive is hence

\[ \tilde{R}_t^D = \begin{cases} R_t^D & \text{if the bank is solvent} \\ x_t^D R_t^D & \text{if the bank is insolvent} \end{cases}. \quad (2.15) \]

### 2.3 Consumption goods producers

Consumption goods producers choose labor \( l_t^F \), capital \( s_{t+1}^F \) and loans \( a_{t+1}^F \) to maximize

\[ E_t \sum_{s=t}^{\infty} \Lambda_{t,s} \Pi_s^F. \quad (2.16) \]

Profits \( \Pi_t^F \) are given by

\[ \Pi_t^F = (k_t^F)^\alpha (l_t^F)^{1-\alpha} - W_t l_t^F + Q_t \left[ a_{t+1}^F - \frac{R_t^A}{Q_t} a_t^F \right] - Q_t \left[ s_{t+1}^F - (1 - \delta) k_t^F \right]. \]

We make a distinction between beginning-of-period capital \( k_t^F \) and end-of-period capital \( s_t^F \). Beginning-of-period capital is given by \( k_t^F = Z_t s_t^F \). Following Merton (1973) and Gertler

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\(^7\)This assumption ensures that bankers do not internalize the effect of their decisions on the recovery value of banks’ creditors in default.
\( Z_t \) is a capital quality shock which generates exogenous variation in the price of capital. We interpret it as fraction of the capital stock becoming obsolete and losing its economic value. The difference to depreciation \( \delta \) is that the capital quality shock arises before production, whereas depreciation occurs after production. It follows an AR(1) process:

\[
\ln(Z_t) = (1 - \rho Z) \mu Z + \rho Z \ln(Z_{t-1}) + \epsilon_t,
\]

(2.17)

where \( |\rho Z| < 1 \) and \( \epsilon_t \sim N(0, \sigma^2 Z) \). Since firms refinance themselves exclusively with loans, their balance sheet constraint is \( s_{t+1}^F = a_{t+1}^F \). Their optimality condition for bank loans implies that

\[
R_t^A = Z_t \left( \alpha(k_t^F)^{\alpha-1}(l_t^F)^{1-\alpha} + (1 - \delta)Q_t \right).
\]

(2.18)

### 2.4 Capital goods producers

Capital goods producers transform consumption goods into capital goods with a technology that has decreasing returns to scale in the short run due to investment adjustment costs. They maximize profits \( \Pi_t^Q \) with respect to their output, \( i_t \). Profits are given by

\[
\Pi_t^Q = Q_t i_t - i_t - \frac{\theta}{2} \left( \frac{i_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 I_{t-1}.
\]

(2.19)

Note that capital producers take aggregate investment in the last period, \( I_{t-1} \), as given. Hence, the problem of the capital producer is static.

### 2.5 Mutual funds

Competitive mutual funds manage the portfolio of loans that households directly invest into the consumption goods producers. Following Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a), they face a cost function of providing this service, which is quadratic in the amount of loans \( \tilde{a}^M_t \) they manage. There is a cutoff \( \zeta \) below which the funds can manage capital as efficiently as banks. They maximize profits, which are given by

\[
\Pi_t^M = f_t \tilde{a}_{t+1}^M - \frac{\chi}{2} \max \left( \frac{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^M}{A_{t+1}} - \zeta, 0 \right)^2 A_{t+1}.
\]

(2.20)

\[\text{Usually in the business cycle literature, firms internalize the effect of their investment decisions on future investment adjustment costs. Moreover, the investment adjustment cost is usually normalized with respect to } I_t \text{ instead of } I_{t-1}. \text{ Since the cost function under these two assumptions is very badly behaved for levels of investment far away from the lagged level of investment, and since we solve for the global equilibrium dynamics of the model, we have adopted this simpler, better behaved formulation.} \]
We model this cost as a function of the share of capital managed by the funds and not as a function of the level to ensure that the mutual fund sector can scale with the economy in the long run. The cutoff $\zeta$ represents the share of investment projects above which the banking sector can better evaluate and monitor. If the mutual fund sector is forced to undertake a larger share of investment, e.g. due to the banking sector being insolvent, an efficiency loss arises.

### 2.6 Aggregation

Since the policy functions of an individual bank are linear in net worth, we will characterize the equilibrium in terms of the aggregate banking sector. The aggregate net worth of the banking sector is given by the sum of the net worth of incumbent and newly entering banks:

$$N_t^B = (1 - \eta)n_t^B + \eta n_{t+1}^{B,\text{new}}.$$  

Aggregate output is given by production net of the capital holding costs:

$$Y_t = K_t^\alpha - \chi \max \left( \frac{A_t^{M}}{A_{t+1}} - \zeta, 0 \right)^2 A_{t+1}. \quad (2.21)$$

We define as aggregate investment $\tilde{I}_t$ as the total expenditure necessary to change the capital stock from $K_t$ to $S_{t+1}$. Therefore, our measure of aggregate investment includes the investment adjustment costs: Define $I_t$ as net investment excluding capital adjustment costs, that is

$$I_t = S_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)K_t.$$  

Then, investment is given by

$$\tilde{I}_t = I_t + \frac{\theta}{2} \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - \delta \right)^2 I_{t-1}. \quad (2.22)$$

There is a representative household. Hence, the individual consumption and aggregate consumption are equal, $c_t^H = C_t^H$. Household consumption can be inferred from the aggregate resource constraint:

$$C_t^H = Y_t - \tilde{I}_t \quad (2.23)$$
2.7 Measuring uncertainty

2.7.1 Macroeconomic uncertainty

We measure macroeconomic uncertainty by the conditional volatility of output \( StDev_t(Y_{t+1}) \), which is given by:

\[
StDev_t(Y_{t+1}) = \left[ Var_t(Y_{t+1}) \right]^{\frac{1}{2}},
\]

\[
Var_t(Y_{t+1}) = \int_{\varepsilon_{t+1}} \left[ p_{t+1} (Y_{t+1}^* - E_t Y_{t+1})^2 + (1 - p_{t+1}) (Y_{t+1} - E_t Y_{t+1})^2 \right] dF(\varepsilon_{t+1})
\]

with the conditional expectation of future output given by

\[
E_t Y_{t+1} = \int_{\varepsilon_{t+1}} \left[ p_{t+1} Y_{t+1}^* + (1 - p_{t+1}) Y_{t+1} \right] dF(\varepsilon_{t+1}).
\]

Intuitively, this conditional volatility tells us how much uncertainty there is around the forecast for output in the next period. This definition of uncertainty is consistent with the one used in Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015).

2.7.2 Financial uncertainty

In addition to conditional output volatility, we include the VIX as a popular measure of uncertainty. We compute the VIX as

\[
VIX_t = 100 \left[ 4 Var_t \left( \frac{R_{t+1}^A}{Q_t} \right) \right]^{\frac{1}{2}},
\]

in line with Basu and Bundick (2017). We compute the conditional variance of the asset return in the same way as the conditional variance of output.

3 Equilibrium

In this section, we formalize the concept of systemic risk in the model. The model has an equilibrium with solvent banks and an equilibrium with insolvent banks. We characterize those equilibria in Appendix D. We discuss here equilibrium multiplicity in the model as well as equilibrium selection.
3.1 Equilibrium multiplicity and banking panics

Since the net worth of incumbent banks is among the state variables which determine the capital price, and the capital price vice versa determines the net worth of banks, there is the possibility for both equilibria to coexist given the same fundamental state of the economy in the model.\(^9\) If bank creditors believe that the capital price is high, they will continue to lend to the banks, which thus remain solvent, so they can lend, which will justify the high capital price. If bank creditors instead believe that the capital price is low, they will not lend to the banks, which as a consequence become insolvent and stop lending to the economy, justifying the low capital price. Note that in contrast to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), the decision of the bank creditors is not about whether to withdraw outstanding debt from the banks or not, but about whether they should roll over their lending to the banks or not. In that sense, a bank run in our model resembles more a rollover crisis in the spirit of Cole and Kehoe (2000) than to a depositor run as analyzed in Diamond and Dybvig (1983). The former corresponds more closely to the events of the financial crisis of 2007-2008, where financial institutions were unable to refinance maturing short-term liabilities on the interbank market. Strategic complementarity between the decisions of the bank creditors arises, because due to 2.8, it is not optimal to lend to a bank with negative net worth.

Define two recovery values for an individual bank: The recovery value \(x^D\) denotes the recovery value of an insolvent, individual bank if no systemic bank default arises. The recovery value \(x^{D,*}\) denotes the recovery value of an individual bank if a systemic bank default arises. We can divide the state space of the model into three zones. In the first zone, the safe zone, both the recovery value without a systemic bank default, \(x^D\), as well as the recovery value of bank creditors with a systemic bank default, \(x^{D,*}\), are bigger than one. This implies that independent of the beliefs of bank creditors about the solvency of the banking sector, the banking sector is solvent. In that case, the no-panic equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the economy.

In the second zone, the multiplicity zone, recovery values are bigger than one if the banking sector as a whole is solvent, but smaller than one if there is a systemic bank default. In this zone, both the equilibrium with solvent banks and the equilibrium with insolvent banks exist, because the solvency of banks depends on the beliefs of bank creditors about the solvency of banks. We assume that agents coordinate on the equilibrium with insolvent banks if they observe the sunspot realization \(\Xi^R\). If agents coordinate on the equilibrium with insolvent banks, we follow Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a) in calling this a banking panic.

\(^9\)As noted by Thaler (2018) and Christiano (2018), there is the possibility of a third, partial default equilibrium in the model, which turns out not to be quantitatively relevant for our calibration.
In the third zone, the crisis zone, recovery values are less than one, both if there is no systemic bank default and if there is a systemic bank default. In that case, the panic equilibrium is the unique equilibrium of the economy, because, independently of the beliefs of the bank creditors, the banking sector is insolvent. The expected probability that the economy will end up in the banking panic equilibrium in the next period is then given by

$$E_t p_{t+1} = p H E_t \begin{cases} \begin{pmatrix} 1 & (x^{D,t}_{t+1} \leq 1 \text{ and } x^{D,*}_{t+1} \leq 1) \\ Default due to insolvency \\ + \begin{pmatrix} 1 & (x^{D,t}_{t+1} > 1 \text{ and } x^{D,*}_{t+1} \leq 1) \\ Default due to panic \end{pmatrix} \end{pmatrix} \end{cases}$$

(3.1)

Note that the state-dependency of the banking panic probability arises only as a result of the state-dependency of the existence condition of the multiplicity zone and the crisis zone. There is no exogenous state-dependency built into the sunspot probability.

### 3.2 Decomposing the banking panic condition

It will be useful to decompose the recovery value of bank creditors into four components:

$$x^{D,*}_{t} = \frac{R^{A,*}_{t}}{R^{A}_{t}} + \frac{R^{A}_{t}}{R^{B}_{t}} - \frac{R^{B}_{t}}{R^{D}_{t}} - 1 = \begin{pmatrix} \text{ Liquidation discount} \\ \text{ Firm credit spread} \\ \text{ Bank credit spread} \\ \text{ Bank leverage} \end{pmatrix}$$

(3.2)

where $R^{B}_{t}$ is the risk-free interest rate. The first term is inversely related to the liquidation discount, which reflects how much asset returns fall in a banking panic. The second and third term measure the spread between the return on bank assets and the return on bank liabilities, which can be interpreted as bank profitability. The last term is inversely related to bank leverage. The model predicts that a banking panic is more likely if the expected liquidation discount is higher, the realized firm credit spread is lower, the bank credit spread is higher and bank leverage is higher.

### 4 Calibration

We now turn to a quantitative evaluation of the macroeconomic effects of the banking panic-driven uncertainty channel. In this section, we outline the calibration strategy for the model
and evaluate the model fit. The calibration is quarterly. We report the parameters in Table 1. We describe the data in Appendix A.

4.1 Calibration strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Technology</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>α 0.36</td>
<td>Production function</td>
<td>36 % Capital income share (standard value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>δ 0.025</td>
<td>Depreciation rate</td>
<td>10 % Annual depreciation rate (standard value)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>θ 1.0233</td>
<td>Investment adjustment cost</td>
<td>Volatility, investment (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ρZ 0.8637</td>
<td>Autocorrelation, shock</td>
<td>Autocorrelation, output (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σε,Z 0.0044</td>
<td>Volatility, shock</td>
<td>Volatility, output (data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Preferences</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>β 0.995</td>
<td>HHI discount factor</td>
<td>Real risk-free rate: 1.87 % p.a. in SSS (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>σ 0.7716</td>
<td>Inverse of IES</td>
<td>Real risk-free rate volatility (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>γ 10.5328</td>
<td>Rel. risk aversion</td>
<td>Credit spread volatility (data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Finance</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>χ 0.0266</td>
<td>Intermediation cost</td>
<td>Bank intermed.: 50 % in SSS (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ζ 0.1827</td>
<td>Intermediation cost</td>
<td>Δ credit spread in panic: 7.29 % p.a. (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ψ 0.3792</td>
<td>Diversion</td>
<td>Leverage: 10 in SSS (Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>η 0.1093</td>
<td>Exit Rate</td>
<td>Avg. credit spread: 3 % p.a. (data)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>υ 1e-3</td>
<td>New banks’ endowment</td>
<td>Small value</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sunspot</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>pR 0.0965</td>
<td>Sunspot prob.</td>
<td>Banking panic probability: 4 % p.a. (Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>π 2/3</td>
<td>Roentry prob.</td>
<td>Banking panics last 3 quarters (data)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Calibration

**Technology** We calibrate the parameter of the production function, α, to match a capital income share of 36 percent. We set the depreciation rate δ to match an annual depreciation rate of 10 percent. To calibrate the autocorrelation ρZ and the standard deviation σε,Z of the capital quality process, we target the autocorrelation and standard deviation of output. We calibrate the investment adjustment cost parameter θ to target the volatility of investment.

**Preferences** We choose the preference parameters β, σ and γ to match asset prices. We set the discount factor of the household, β, to match the real risk-free interest rate in the stochastic steady state. To exclude the zero lower bound period, we use the average interest rate between the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2006 as the empirical counterpart. We choose the inverse of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, σ, to match the volatility of the real risk-free interest rate and the risk aversion, γ, to match the volatility of the credit spread.
Financial sector  There are five parameters for the financial sector: The loan management fee parameters $\chi$ and $\zeta$, the share of divertable assets $\psi$, the exit rate of bankers $\eta$ and the initial endowment of new bankers $\nu$. We set these parameters jointly to target the following moments: A share of intermediation through the banking sector of 50 percent in the stochastic steady state, in line with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), a leverage of 10 in the stochastic steady state, in line with Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Begenau and Landvoigt (2018) and the evidence in Di Tella (2019), a credit spread of about 3.7 percent in the stochastic steady state, consistent with the average spread between the Moody’s BAA yield and the Federal Funds Rate between the first quarter of 1986 and the last quarter of 2006 and an increase in the credit spread in a panic of 7.29 percent. This corresponds to the peak to trough change in the Moody’s BAA spread over the federal funds rate from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2008.

Sunspot  We set the sunspot probability $p^R$ to match a frequency of banking crises of about 4 percent per year, consistent with the frequency of financial crises in developed economies in Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2011). Finally, we set the persistence of the panic equilibrium $\pi$ to target an average duration of a banking crisis of 3 quarters, which corresponds to the time until the TED spread returned to normal levels and the XLF financial equity index stopped falling after the banking panic in the last quarter of 2008.

4.2 Model Fit

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Output (%)</td>
<td>4.073</td>
<td>4.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Investment (%)</td>
<td>12.311</td>
<td>10.090</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Autocorrelation, Output</td>
<td>99.008</td>
<td>98.930</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deposit Rate in SSS (% p.a.)</td>
<td>1.870</td>
<td>1.875</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Credit Spread in SSS (% p.a.)</td>
<td>3.886</td>
<td>3.885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Deposit Rate (%)</td>
<td>2.107</td>
<td>1.692</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Credit Spread (%)</td>
<td>1.614</td>
<td>1.293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Lending/Total Lending in SSS (%)</td>
<td>50.000</td>
<td>47.894</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Leverage in SSS</td>
<td>10.000</td>
<td>9.512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Run Frequency (% p.a.)</td>
<td>4.089</td>
<td>4.156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Run Duration (yrs)</td>
<td>0.750</td>
<td>0.747</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean, $\Delta$ Credit Spread in Crisis (% p.a.)</td>
<td>7.290</td>
<td>7.341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Targeted moments

Note: The simulated moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in. The stochastic steady state is computed as the state of the economy after a simulation of 1000 periods without any shocks.
Table 2 reports how well the model fits the targeted moments. The standard deviation of output and investment are matched reasonably well. The model can match the autocorrelation of output. It also does a good job at matching asset prices with reasonable parameters for household preferences: the deposit rate and the credit spread in the stochastic steady state are matched well. The standard deviation of the deposit rate and the standard deviation of the credit spread are matched well. The model can match the ratio of bank lending to total lending and bank leverage. The frequency of banking panics is also matched well. Interestingly, we found in numerical exercises that increasing the sunspot probability reduces the frequency of banking panics. This is because an increase in the expected probability of a banking crisis forces banks to delever. This result is reminiscent of the volatility paradox discussed in Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014). The banking panic duration and the increase in the credit spread during a banking panic are matched well. Overall, the model can match all moments quite well, which is not trivial, given that it is a highly nonlinear model with complex dynamics.

5 A typical banking panic

After having calibrated the model, we first use it to study what a typical realized banking panic looks like. The purpose of this exercise is to ensure that banking panics in the model capture some stylized facts about financial crises in the data: Namely that they are disastrous events which cause a long-lived fall in macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices.

5.1 Peak-to-trough changes during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in the model and in the data

In Figure 2 and Table 3, we report the ability of the model to fit data from the financial crisis in the US during the period of 2007-2009. For this exercise, we compare the effect of a typical banking panic in the model on macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices to the peak-to-trough changes in those variables in the data. In line with Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a), we assume that a banking panic happened in the data in the last quarter of 2008. The last quarter of 2008 was when Lehmann Brothers failed, which was followed by major disruptions of financial markets and subsequent failures of other financial institutions. To construct the tables and figures in this section, we follow Paul (2018): first, we simulate 10000 economies for 1000 periods. We then find all banking panics and compute the average path around a typical panic event. We discard all panics where another panic happens within 100 quarters before to 20 quarters after the panic to ensure that we capture only the effect of a single panic.
Consider first Figure 2. It shows the dynamics of key macroeconomic and financial variables around a typical banking panic in a simulation of the model. The blue, solid line reports the average path of the respective variable around a typical panic. Since there is substantial heterogeneity in the paths, we also report the range in which 90 percent of all banking panics fall as the shaded area. The red line is the data. We can see that the model reproduces the dynamics of key macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices well. Note that we neither select the shocks to fit the data nor target any of the macroeconomic dynamics besides the credit spread in our calibration.

Consider next Table 3. Consistent with the NBER recession dates for the financial crisis, we compute the change in output, consumption, and investment from the last quarter of 2007 to the second quarter of 2009. We compute the change in asset prices from the first quarter of 2007 to the last quarter of 2008, since the stress in the financial markets started earlier and peaked in the last quarter of 2008, simultaneously with the banking panic.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Data</th>
<th>Model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Output (%)</td>
<td>-3.983</td>
<td>-6.908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption (%)</td>
<td>-2.394</td>
<td>-2.833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment (%)</td>
<td>-29.429</td>
<td>-20.614</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bank Credit Spread (%) p.a.</td>
<td>1.356</td>
<td>0.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firm Credit Spread (%) p.a.</td>
<td>7.293</td>
<td>7.341</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Peak-to-trough changes during the financial crisis of 2007-2009 in macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices in the model and the data.

Note: For output, consumption and investment, we define the peak of the great recession as the last quarter of 2007 and the trough as the second quarter of 2009, consistent with the NBER recession dates. For the bank credit spread and the firm credit spread, we define the peak as January 2007 and the trough as October 2008. The model moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.

The model does a good job at matching a fall in output of a roughly similar magnitude as in the data. The model produces a similar fall in consumption around a typical banking panic compared to the financial crisis in the US. The fall in the model is a bit larger, because it is more persistent than in the data. The fall in investment in the model is smaller than in the data. The rise in bank credit spreads is too small. This is natural, the model lumps together all bank liabilities, which includes not only market lending, which is our data counterpart, but also bank deposits. The model also matches the increase in the cost of financing to the real economy.
Figure 2: Dynamics around a typical banking panic in the model and in the data.

Note: The blue line denotes the response of an average economy around a banking panic. Since there is substantial heterogeneity in the simulation, the shaded area reports the range within which 90 percent of the typical banking crises fall. Moments of a simulation of 10000 economies for 1000 periods. We drop all crises where a previous crisis occurred in the last 100 quarters before the panic until 20 periods after the panic. The data for output, consumption and investment are detrended using the CBO potential output estimate. The credit spread is the spread between the Moody’s BAA yield and the Federal Funds Rate. The financial sector net worth is the XLF index as a percentage deviation from the 2007Q3 value.
5.2 Model dynamics around a typical banking panic

After comparing the model to the data, we now focus on the mechanism of how a banking panic unfolds in the model. Figure 3 shows the dynamics of additional variables around a banking panic. The blue line is the path if a banking panic occurs. The red line is the counterfactual average path if there is no panic in period zero. The difference between the blue line and the red line gives us the additional impact of an average banking panic, given the same initial conditions and the same sequence of capital quality shocks. The thin, black line reports the value of the respective variable in the stochastic steady state.

In the first panel, we show the sequence of exogenous capital quality shocks around a typical banking panic. These shocks are of course identical for the panic and the no panic economies. We observe that banking panics typically arise after a sequence of negative capital quality shocks. The shocks reduce the net worth of banks and the recovery value in the case of a banking panic. As a consequence, the likelihood of a banking panic increases. Due to the higher likelihood of a panic, financial uncertainty, as measured by the VIX, and macroeconomic uncertainty, as measured by the conditional output volatility, increase.

If a panic is triggered, bank net worth and bank lending fall to zero and financial intermediation will only occur through the mutual fund sector. It is best to think of the mutual fund sector in our model as the part of the financial sector in which financial frictions played a lesser role during the financial crisis, like smaller commercial banks. The banking sector in our model should be interpreted as comprising large commercial banks and shadow banks, including broker-dealers. This fall in bank intermediation leads to a spike in the expected firm credit spread, as mutual funds require a higher expected return than banks. As a consequence, we see that investment decreases dramatically, and so does output due to both the lower capital stock and the efficiency losses due to the lack of bank intermediation.

After the banking panic, the net worth of the banking sector slowly rebuilds as new banks start to enter the economy. Expected returns on firm loans are high, due to the high required return of mutual funds. Newly entering banks are therefore highly profitable, which also means that they have a high leverage capacity. High bank leverage in turn lowers expected recovery values, which increases the likelihood of a second banking panic in the aftermath of the first one. Hence, credit spreads and conditional volatility remain elevated and investment and output subdued until the net worth of the banking sector has fully rebuild.

Overall, we can see that banking panics are dramatic events which substantially influence the dynamics of both macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices. Moreover, we can see that

\[11\text{Alternatively, it gives us the additional change in the variable from moving from the equilibrium with solvent banks to the equilibrium with a systemic bank default.}\]
Figure 3: Dynamics around a typical banking panic - exploring the mechanism.

Note: The blue line denotes the response of an average economy around a banking panic. The red line shows the average path, across economies, if no banking panic occurs, given the same initial conditions and the same sequence of shocks. Moments of a simulation of 10000 economies for 1000 periods. We drop all crises where a previous crisis occurred in the last 100 quarters before the panic until 20 periods after the panic.
banking panic risk is reflected in asset prices even before the panic occurs. A particular strength of the model is that it produces the empirically observed co-movement in asset prices and quantities before and after banking panics.

6 Banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty

In the last section, we have studied the conditional response of the economy to a realized banking crisis. We have shown that both the build-up and the aftermath of a banking crisis are episodes of high systemic risk and high conditional volatility. While banking crises are dramatic events, they are however also rare events, such that it is unclear whether systemic risk in the financial sector should have an effect on aggregate uncertainty and macroeconomic dynamics outside a banking panic. In this section, we illustrate how an increase in banking panic risk can increase macroeconomic uncertainty. We show that both banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty are highly state-dependent. Finally, we discuss how macroeconomic uncertainty affects the economy and feeds back into banking panic risk through a precautionary savings channel and a financial frictions channel.

6.1 The effect of banking panic risk on macroeconomic uncertainty

To illustrate the effects of banking panic risk on conditional output volatility, we consider the following thought experiment: Suppose we compare two economies which are identical, economy A and economy B. The only difference is that in economy A, sunspot shocks can lead agents to coordinate on the panic equilibrium if multiple equilibria are possible, whereas in economy B, agents never coordinate on the panic equilibrium if multiple equilibria are possible. By how much is the conditional volatility of output in economy A in the region with equilibrium multiplicity higher than in economy B?

The left panels of Figures 4 and 5 show the cumulative distribution function of the conditional distribution of output and asset returns. The economy with panics is the solid blue line and the economy without panics the dashed red line. We compare the economies for the same state of the economy at time $t$. We can see that for the economy without panics, the range of possible realizations of output is distributed symmetrically around expected output. In contrast to that, for the economy with panics, a second, albeit small fraction of the distribution lies at around 7 percent below expected output. As a consequence of this, the conditional volatility of output is roughly twice as high in the economy with panics compared to the economy without panics.
Figure 4: The conditional distribution of output in economies with and without panics.

Note: We hold the state of the economy at time $t$ fixed. The policy functions come from the numerical solution of the model under the baseline calibration, where for the economy with sunspots, $p_R^T = 0.1$ while for the economy without sunspots, $p_R^T = 0$.

Figure 5: The conditional distribution of asset returns in economies with and without panics.

Note: We hold the state of the economy at time $t$ fixed. The policy functions come from the numerical solution of the model under the baseline calibration, where for the economy with sunspots, $p_R^T = 0.1$ while for the economy without sunspots, $p_R^T = 0$. 
This increase in the conditional volatility of output and asset returns will only arise in future states of the economy where the banking panic equilibrium exists, which depends on the state of the economy today. As a consequence, the conditional volatility of output and asset returns are endogenously highly state-dependent. To illustrate this, consider the right panels of Figures 4 and 5. These compare the economy with panics to the economy without panics in a state in which there is no banking panic risk. In this state, the conditional volatility of future output and asset returns are essentially identical in both economies. Banking panic risk thus only increases the left tail of the output distribution, and only during times of heightened financial stress, in line with the empirical evidence in Giglio, Kelly, and Pruitt (2016) and Adrian, Boyarchenko, and Giannone (2019).

6.2 The dynamics of banking panic risk and uncertainty outside a banking panic

In Figure 6, we show the generalized impulse response of the economy to a two standard deviation negative capital quality shock, conditional on no panic occurring. The blue lines are the impulse responses from the baseline model in which banking panics can occur, the red lines are those from an alternative model without banking panics.

We see that the shock increases the probability of a banking panic in the baseline model. As a consequence, macroeconomic and financial uncertainty increase. In the model without banking panics, this increase is substantially lower. Credit spreads for both banks and firms increase more in the baseline model. Taken together, these results show that the possibility of banking panics has a strong effect on uncertainty and asset prices. Regarding quantities, output dynamics are essentially unchanged, while investment decreases by about the same amount in both models, but increases more afterwards in the model with panics. This is because the higher credit spread allows banks to accumulate net worth faster.

6.3 The feedback loop between banking panic risk and macroeconomic uncertainty

The increase in macroeconomic uncertainty due to the higher banking panic risk affects the macroeconomy through three channels:

First, a precautionary savings channel, working through the risk-free interest rate, leads households to reduce their demand for bank debt and their demand for loans issued by the non-financial sector: Consider first the households’ first-order condition for the risk-free
Figure 6: The generalized impulse response to a two-standard deviation negative capital quality shock.

Note: We simulate 10000 economies for 1040 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in. In period 1010, we hit each economy with an additional two-standard deviation capital quality shock. We report the conditional average across economies. Baseline is the model with banking panics. No Runs is a model in which we set the sunspot probability to zero.
Using the definition of the stochastic discount factor, we can write the risk-free interest rate as

\[
R^B_{t+1} = \left[ \mathbb{E}_t \beta \left( \frac{C^H_{t+1}}{C^H_t} \right)^{-\sigma} \right]^{-1} \left[ \mathbb{E}_t \left[ \left( \frac{V^H_{t+1}}{(V^H_{t+1})^{1-\gamma}} \right) \right]^{\frac{\sigma-\gamma}{\sigma-\gamma}} \right]^1 
\]

The first term, CRRA, corresponds to the stochastic discount factor with constant relative risk aversion and is concave in consumption growth in the next period. The second term, LRR, is concave in long-run consumption growth, if \( \gamma > \sigma \). The first three panels of Figure 7 show the generalized impulse response of the risk-free interest rate as well as its two components, CRRA and LRR, after a two standard-deviation negative capital quality shock. We can see that there is a small additional fall in the risk-free interest rate in the model with panics compared to the model without panics, mostly due to the CRRA term. The model does not generate a big amount of long-run risk, such that the contribution of the LRR term to the fall in the risk-free rate is small.

Consider next the first-order condition for the direct lending of the household to the non-financial sector:

\[
Q_t + f_t = \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} R^A_{t+1}. 
\]

Using this equation, we can write the credit spread as

\[
\mathbb{E}_t \frac{R^A_{t+1}}{Q_t} - R^B_{t+1} = \left( \frac{f_t}{Q_t} - \text{cov}_t \left( \frac{R^A_{t+1}}{Q_t}, \Lambda_{t,t+1} \right) R^B_{t+1} \right) 
\]

There are two important terms. The first, \( \frac{f_t}{Q_t} \), reflects a liquidity premium that is higher when households hold a larger share of the assets of the economy. The second term reflects a risk premium for the correlation between the stochastic discount factor and the return on loans. Panels 4 to 6 of Figure 7 show the generalized impulse responses of the credit spread,
Figure 7: The effects of uncertainty - exploring the mechanism.

Note: We simulate 10000 economies for 1040 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in. In period 1010, we hit each economy with an additional two-standard deviation capital quality shock. We report the conditional average across economies. Baseline is the model with banking panics. No Runs is a model in which we set the sunspot probability to zero.
as well as the liquidity premium and the risk premium. The credit spread increases more in the model with banking panics. As we can see, a large fraction of the increase in the credit spread stems from the liquidity premium, which reflects financial constraints of banks and is similar in both models. The additional increase in the credit spread we see in the model with panics stems however mostly from the risk premium, which increases substantially more in the model with panics.

Finally, an increase in uncertainty operates through a bank leverage channel, which tightens the leverage constraint of banks. This leverage constraint can be rewritten as

\[
\phi_t^B = \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \psi - \mathbb{E}_t \tilde{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \left( \frac{R_{t+1}^D}{Q_t} - R_{t+1}^D \right)_{AP}
\]

There are two key terms: First, the adjusted stochastic discount factor of the banking sector, SDF, which reflects the value of an additional unit of net worth in the banking sector in the next period from the perspective of the households owning the banks. Second, there is a term, AP, which relates to asset prices. It is increasing in both the deposit rate and the credit spread. The last three panels of Figure 7 show the impulse responses of leverage, as well as the stochastic discount factor and the asset price term. Leverage increases less in the model with banking panics, reflecting relatively tighter financial constraints. We can see that most of the change in leverage comes from the stochastic discount factor, which reflects that if there is default risk in the banking sector, the value of an additional unit of net worth in the banking sector is lower. The term related to asset prices actually increases more, reflecting the higher credit spread in the model with panics, but it is ultimately less important for leverage dynamics.

Taken together, we can see that the quantitatively most important channel through which panic risk affects the economy is the bank leverage channel, with the credit spread channel playing a somewhat smaller role, and the precautionary savings channel being unimportant.

### 6.4 Unconditional effects of banking panic risk

We study next the unconditional effects of banking panic risk on macroeconomic uncertainty and business cycle dynamics. We first show that elevated banking panic risk increases macroeconomic uncertainty unconditionally. Second, we show that this time-varying uncertainty amplifies the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices.

Table 4 shows that banking panic driven uncertainty amplifies macroeconomic volatil-
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Systemic Risk</th>
<th>With Panics</th>
<th>No Panics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean, Panic Probability (% p.a.)</td>
<td>4.160</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr. with Output, Panic Probability (% p.a.)</td>
<td>-0.283</td>
<td>-</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aggregate Uncertainty</th>
<th>With Panics</th>
<th>No Panics</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mean, $StDev_t(Y_{t+1})$ (%)</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corr. with Output, $StDev_t(Y_{t+1})$ (%)</td>
<td>-0.426</td>
<td>-0.446</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VIX</th>
<th>With Panics</th>
<th>No Panics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean, $VIX_t$ (%)</td>
<td>3.321</td>
<td>2.750</td>
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<tr>
<td>Corr. with Output, $VIX_t$ (%)</td>
<td>-0.251</td>
<td>0.711</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Macroeconomic Dynamics</th>
<th>With Panics</th>
<th>No Panics</th>
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<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Output (%)</td>
<td>4.875</td>
<td>4.230</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Consumption (%)</td>
<td>7.197</td>
<td>6.582</td>
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<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Investment (%)</td>
<td>10.079</td>
<td>7.321</td>
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<table>
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<tr>
<th>Asset Prices</th>
<th>With Panics</th>
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<tr>
<td>Mean, Bank Credit Spread (% p.a.)</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean, Firm Credit Spread (% p.a.)</td>
<td>4.351</td>
<td>3.593</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Bank Credit Spread (% p.a.)</td>
<td>0.070</td>
<td>0.000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>St. Dev., Firm Credit Spread (% p.a.)</td>
<td>1.293</td>
<td>0.392</td>
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</table>

Table 4: The importance of banking panic driven uncertainty for macroeconomic dynamics and asset prices.

*Note:* *With Panics* is the model with expected and realized banking panics. *No Panics* is the model with neither expected nor realized banking panics. The moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.
ity. We compare and simulate two models: In the first model, panics are anticipated and materialize. In the second model, crises are unanticipated and never materialize.

We see that banking panic risk varies substantially over time: The unconditional probability of a banking panic is about 4 percent per year. The probability of a panic is moreover countercyclical, since bank leverage is high and realized bank asset returns are low during recessions, leading to low recovery values for bank creditors and hence elevated banking panic risk.

Banking panic risk increases aggregate uncertainty substantially. Output volatility in the model with banking panics is about 0.7 percent, in the model without banking panics, it is about 0.3 percent. The VIX in the model with banking panics is around 3.3 on average, in the model without banking panics, it is around 2.7. Both are also countercyclical, and the countercyclicality is more pronounced in the model with banking panic risk.

Comparing the unconditional realized volatilities of output, consumption and investment of the models with and without banking panics in Table 4, we see that banking panics increase the unconditional realized volatility of output, consumption and investment. Moreover, the level as well as the realized volatility of the bank credit spread and the firm credit spread are higher. Taken together, our results imply that banking panics are a powerful mechanism that amplifies the volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices and increases credit spreads, even though banking panics are rare events.

7 Macroprudential regulation

In this section, we discuss how the banking panic-driven uncertainty channel affects the desirability of a typical macroprudential policy, namely a countercyclical capital buffer (CCyB). The rule for the CCyB we introduce should be seen as a qualitative illustration of the macroeconomic effects of implementing a CCyB. A rigorous analysis of the optimal dynamic capital regulation is not the focus of our study. Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019b) show in a similar model in which ways the CCyB rule considered here would have to be extended to achieve a sizeable welfare gain relative to an economy without regulation.

In the economy considered here, agents do not internalize how their decisions affect equilibrium prices. Since equilibrium prices feed back into the incentive constraint 2.8 of banks, there exists a pecuniary externality. Banks lend and borrow too much during times of high

\[12\] Note that we compute the VIX assuming that firms have zero leverage, and that we abstract from idiosyncratic risks. Taking those factors into account would allow us to also match the level of the VIX without changing the key results of the model.

\[13\] For discussions of optimal regulation in the presence of pecuniary externalities, see Dávila and Korinek (2017) and Bianchi and Mendoza (2018).
net worth when the leverage constraint is loose, which forces them to contract borrowing and lending excessively during times of low net worth. A regulator can reduce volatility and potentially increase welfare by limiting bank lending in times of loose market leverage constraints. This relaxes leverage constraints in times of otherwise relatively tight leverage constraints, which stabilizes asset prices and reduces the frequency of banking panics. We show that in the presence of panic-driven uncertainty, the benefits from the CCyB are larger. Banking panic driven uncertainty is therefore an important channel which macroprudential regulators should take into account.

7.1 A capital requirement with a countercyclical buffer

Consider again the capital requirement we introduced in equation 2.11. We set $\bar{\phi} = \phi^B$, which is the value of leverage in the stochastic steady state. We do this because the focus of our analysis is on the effects of the countercyclical capital buffer on macroeconomic dynamics, and not on the optimal level of capital requirements. An analysis of the optimal policy that maximizes welfare would require finding the value of $\phi^B$ at which the capital requirement should trigger, as well as the optimal elasticity, $\tau$. We leave this for future research. Due to our assumption that banks can only obtain additional equity by accumulating internal funds, an increase in the capital requirement forces banks to reduce lending to the nonfinancial sector. According to equation 2.7, total bank lending as a deviation from the stochastic steady state can be written as

$$\ln Q_t^{AB} - \ln QA^B = \ln \phi^B_t - \ln N_t^{B} - \ln N^B.$$  \hfill (7.1)

If the capital requirement binds, this becomes

$$\ln Q_{t+1}^{AB} - \ln QA^B = -\tau(\ln N_t^{B} - \ln N^B) + \ln N_t^{B} - \ln N^B$$

$$= (1 - \tau)(\ln N_t^{B} - \ln N^B).$$  \hfill (7.2)

As a stylized example to illustrate the importance of banking panic-driven uncertainty for macroprudential regulation, we set $\tau = 1$. For that value, the regulator can reduce the comovement between net worth and bank lending, and hence the feedback loop between bank balance sheets and asset prices, completely. For $\tau$ less than 1, there is still positive comovement between net worth and bank lending, while for $\tau$ more than one, bank lending will start to comove negatively with bank net worth. $\tau = 0$ corresponds to the case of a constant capital requirement.

Figure 8 illustrates how the combination of a capital requirement and the CCYB works.
7.2 The effects of the CCyB on a boom-bust cycle without a bank ing panic

Figure 9 illustrates the dynamics with the CCyB. It shows the generalized impulse response to a positive capital quality shock, followed by a negative capital quality shock 10 periods after. This experiment simulates a normal boom-bust cycle without a financial crisis. The
blue line is the baseline economy without regulation, the red line the economy with a CCyB.

We can see that with a CCyB, leverage falls less after a positive shock, reflecting that the CCyB binds in good times. However, as a consequence of the CCyB, leverage can increase more after the negative shock. Consequently, the volatility of bank lending gets reduced. The CCyB is successful at reducing the volatility of investment and output.

7.3 The effects of the CCyB on a banking panic

Figure 10 shows the effects of imposing a CCyB on the dynamics around a banking panic. We first simulate the baseline model and compute the average path of all variables around a banking panic. The resulting paths are shown as the blue line. Then we simulate the counterfactual path under the policy rules with a CCyB for each initial condition and each path of exogenous shocks. These counterfactual paths are shown in red.

We can see that for some of the economies in which a banking panic occurs in the baseline model, there is no banking panic in the model with a CCyB. As a consequence, credit spreads increase on average by less and output and investment fall on average by less. After a banking panic, the probability of another panic occurring is also lower.

7.4 Welfare effects from macroprudential regulation

In this section, we evaluate the benefits of the macroprudential policy. Table 5 reports welfare measured in consumption equivalent units and various measures that are commonly considered by policymakers: the level of output and consumption in the stochastic steady state, the volatility of output and consumption, the frequency of banking panics, and macroeconomic uncertainty as measured by the conditional output volatility and the VIX.

The first two columns show the results for the economy with anticipated and realized banking panics. We can see that introducing the CCyB lowers the probability of a financial panic and lowers conditional expected output volatility. The CCyB affects the economy through two channels: First, with a CCyB, fewer banking panics will materialize. Hence, the realized volatility in the economy will be lower. Second, the CCyB also reduces the expected volatility in the economy by lowering expected banking panic risk. The level of output and consumption are lower with the CCyB. The specific CCyB rule we consider here is not successful at inducing a welfare gain. This is because the CCyB we consider here increases monotonically with bank net worth. As we can see in Figure 8, this implies that the regulatory capital requirement can become very high for high values of bank net worth. This is not how CCyBs are designed in reality, where regulators impose an upper bound for how much the CCyB can increase. Imposing such an upper bound in our model would lead
Figure 9: Dynamics with and without a countercyclical capital buffer during a boom-bust cycle without a banking panic.

Note: We simulate 10000 economies for 1040 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in. In period 1010, we hit each economy with an additional positive two-standard deviation capital quality shock, and in period 1020, we hit each economy with a negative two-standard deviation capital quality shock. We report the conditional average across economies. Baseline is the model with banking panics. With CCyB is a model with a countercyclical capital buffer.
Figure 10: Dynamics with and without a countercyclical capital buffer around a typical banking panic.

Note: The blue line denotes the response of an average economy around a banking panic. The red line shows the average path across economies, using alternative policy functions from the model where the regulator imposes a countercyclical capital buffer. For both paths, we use the same initial conditions and the same sequences of shocks. Moments of a simulation of 10000 economies for 1000 periods. We drop all crises where a previous crisis occurred in the last 100 quarters before the panic until 20 periods after the panic.
Table 5: The effects of a countercyclical capital requirement.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>With Panics</th>
<th>No Panics</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Baseline CCyB</td>
<td>Baseline CCyB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macroeconomic Aggregates</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output, Mean (Baseline = 100)</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>99.815</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption, Mean (Baseline = 100)</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>99.527</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Output, St. Dev. (%)</td>
<td>4.875</td>
<td>4.510</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Consumption, St. Dev. (%)</td>
<td>7.197</td>
<td>7.097</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Systemic Risk and Aggregate Uncertainty</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean, Panic Probability (% p.a.)</td>
<td>4.160</td>
<td>3.595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean, StDev(Y_{t+1}) (%)</td>
<td>0.666</td>
<td>0.543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean, VIX_{t} (%)</td>
<td>3.321</td>
<td>2.892</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Welfare, Mean (Baseline = 100)</td>
<td>100.000</td>
<td>99.921</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: With panics is the model with anticipated and realized banking panics. No panics is the model without banking panics. Baseline refers to the model without regulation, CCyB to the model with a countercyclical capital buffer. The moments come from a simulation of 10000 economies for 2000 periods, discarding the first 1000 periods as burn-in.*

to a welfare gain, as shown in a similar model in Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019b).

In contrast, we can see from the last two columns that in the model without banking panics, the capital requirement decreases conditional volatility much less than in the other model. This is since it does not have the additional benefit of reducing the frequency of banking panics. It can, however, still reduce the volatility of output and consumption. Taken together, our results imply that banking panic-driven uncertainty is an important novel channel that leads to additional implications for macroprudential regulation.

8 Conclusion

In this paper, we show that episodes of elevated systemic risk in the banking sector lead to increased macroeconomic uncertainty. We start with the observation that during the financial crisis of 2007-2008, both measures of systemic risk in the banking sector and measures of macroeconomic uncertainty spiked. Investment and asset prices fell, consistent with empirical evidence and theories on the effects of an increase in uncertainty on macroeconomic outcomes.\textsuperscript{14} Motivated by these stylized facts, we build a model of a production economy with a financially constrained banking sector subject to occasional endogenous banking pan-

\textsuperscript{14}E.g. Gourio (2012), Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015), Basu and Bundick (2017).
ics, based on Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015) and Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2019a). We calibrate the model to match macroeconomic and asset price data and use it to study the link between systemic risk in the banking sector and macroeconomic uncertainty more broadly.

We have three main findings: First, we show that an increase in systemic risk leads to an increase in macroeconomic uncertainty. This is because banking panics are more likely in future states of the world with bad realizations of the exogenous shock, such that an increase in the likelihood of a banking panic widens the left tail of the conditional distribution of future endogenous variables. To our knowledge, establishing this link between banking panic risk and aggregate uncertainty and exploring its implications are novel contributions to the literature.

Second, we show that this endogenous uncertainty due to elevated banking panic risk feeds back into the economy by tightening the financial constraint in the banking sector. It does so through a bank leverage channel, which operates through the value of the banks’ cash flows, a precautionary savings channel which operates through the risk-free interest rate, and a credit spread channel. This increases the unconditional volatility of macroeconomic aggregates and asset prices and amplifies the response of the economy to a shock.

Third, we show that macroprudential policies that reduce the financial accelerator effect, like for example a countercyclical capital buffer, have additional effects if there is endogenous banking panic risk. Therefore, we present a novel channel through which macroprudential policy can affect the macroeconomy.

The role of endogenous uncertainty due to systemic risk is a fruitful topic for future research in both the literature on financial crises and the literature on the role of uncertainty for business cycles. First, it leads to a new channel through which disruptions in the banking sector can affect the aggregate economy. Second, it allows us a better understanding of where uncertainty in the economy comes from. Third, the banking panic uncertainty presented here is likely to be amplified through other channels that have been shown to amplify exogenous uncertainty shocks, like nominal frictions (Basu and Bundick (2017), Born and Pfeifer (2019)) or search frictions in the labor market (Leduc and Liu (2016), Cacciatore and Ravenna (2018)).

References


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A Data

The sample period is the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2018. In terms of macroeconomic aggregates, we use real gross domestic product, real gross private domestic investment and real personal consumption expenditures from the BEA. Consumption, investment and output are detrended with the CBO potential output estimate. The real interest rate is the federal funds rate minus the year-on-year change over the previous year in the price index for all urban consumers for all products. The bank credit spread is the TED spread. The firm credit spread is the Moody’s BAA bond yield minus the federal funds rate. The real uncertainty index is taken from Jurado, Ludvigson, and Ng (2015). For asset prices, we use a pre-crisis sample to avoid the zero-lower bound period. We define the pre-crisis sample as the first quarter of 1986 to the last quarter of 2006.

B Full statement of the model

Households’ problem

\[ V_t^H = \max_{a_{t+1}^H,b_{t+1}^H,d_{t+1}^H,c_{t+1}^H} \left( (1 - \beta) \left( c_t^H \right)^{1-\sigma} + \beta \mathbb{E}_t \left[ (V_{t+1}^H)^{1-\gamma} \right] \right)^{\frac{1-\sigma}{\gamma-1}} \] (B.1)

s.t., if no bank default:

\[ c_t^H + (Q_t + f_t^H) a_{t+1}^H + d_{t+1}^H + b_{t+1}^H = W_t + R_t^A a_t^H + R_t^D d_t^H + R_t^B b_t^H + \Pi_t \] (B.2)

if bank default:

\[ c_t^H + (Q_t + f_t^H) a_{t+1}^H + b_{t+1}^H = W_t + R_t^A a_t^H + x_t^D R_t^D d_t^H + R_t^B b_t^H + \Pi_t \] (B.3)

\[ x_t^D \], defined below.

Banks’ problem

\[ V_t^B = \max_{a_{t+1}^B,d_{t+1}^B} \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t+1} \left( \eta m_{t+1}^B + (1 - \eta)V_{t+1}^B \right) \] (B.4)
\[ n_t^B = \begin{cases} R_t^A a_t^B - R_t^B d_t^B & \text{if old} \\ vA_t & \text{if new} \end{cases} \]  
(B.5)

\[ Q_t a_t^B = d_{t+1}^B + n_t^B \]  
Debt Equity  
(B.6)

\[ \psi Q_t a_t^B \leq V_t^B \]  
(B.7)

**Consumption good producers’ problem**

\[ V_t^F = \max_{a_t^F, k_{t+1}, l_t} \left( \Pi_t^F + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} V_{t+1}^F \right) \]  
(B.8)

s.t.

\[ \Pi_t^F = e^{\mu^A s_t^A I_t - \alpha} + (1 - \delta) Q_t s_t - Q_t k_{t+1} - W_t l_t - R_t^A a_t^F + a_{t+1}^F \]  
(B.9)

\[ k_{t+1} = a_{t+1}^F \]  
(B.10)

\[ k_t = Z_t s_t \]  
(B.11)

\[ \ln Z_t = (1 - \rho Z) \mu Z + \rho Z \ln Z_{t-1} + \varepsilon Z \]  
(B.12)

**Capital good producers’ problem**

\[ V_t^Q = \max_{i_t} \left( \Pi_t^Q + \mathbb{E}_t \Lambda_{t,t+1} V_{t+1}^Q \right) \]  
(B.13)

s.t.

\[ \Pi_t^Q = Q_t i_t - i_t - \theta \left( \frac{i_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right)^2 I_{t-1} \]  
(B.14)

**Mutual funds’ problem**

\[ \max_{\tilde{a}_t^H} \Pi_t^L \]  
(B.15)

s.t.

\[ \Pi_t^L = f_t^H a_{t+1}^H - \frac{\chi}{2} \max \left( \frac{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^H}{A_{t+1} - \zeta}, 0 \right)^2 A_{t+1} \]  
(B.16)

**Aggregation**  Profits of households

\[ \Pi_t = \Pi_t^Q + \Pi_t^F + \Pi_t^L + \eta (R_t^A A_t^B - R_t^B D_t^B - \nu A_t) \]  
(B.17)
Bank net worth

\[ N_t^B = (1 - \eta)(R_t^A A_t^B - R_t^D D_t^B) + \eta \nu A_t \]  

(B.18)

**Market clearing**  
Deposits

\[ D_{t+1}^H = D_{t+1}^B \]  

(B.19)

Loans

\[ A_{t+1}^H + A_{t+1}^B = A_{t+1}^F \]  

(B.20)

Capital

\[ I_t = S_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) K_t \]  

(B.21)

Labor

\[ L_t = 1 \]  

(B.22)

Loan services

\[ \tilde{A}_{t+1}^H = \tilde{A}_{t+1}^M \]  

(B.23)

Risk-free bond

\[ B_{t+1}^H = 0 \]  

(B.24)

Aggregate resource constraint

\[ e^{\mu A} S_t^a L_t^{1-a} - \frac{\chi}{2} \max \left( \frac{\tilde{a}_{t+1}^H}{A_{t+1}^H} - \zeta, 0 \right) A_{t+1} = C_t^H + I_t \left( 1 + \theta \left( \frac{I_t}{I_{t-1}} - 1 \right) \frac{I_{t-1}}{I_t} \right) \]  

(B.25)

C  **Proofs**

*Proof of Proposition 2.1.* We proceed as follows: We guess that the value function is linear in the net worth of an individual bank and then verify this guess. We guess that the value function can be written as

\[ V_t^B = \Omega_t^B n_t^B. \]  

(C.1)
The problem of a bank $B.4$ can be restated as follows:

$$
\Omega_t^B n_t^B = \max_{a_{t+1}^B} \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ \eta + (1 - \eta) \Omega_{t+1}^B \right] n_{t+1}^B \\
= \max_{a_{t+1}^B} \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \left[ \eta + (1 - \eta) \Omega_{t+1}^B \right] \left[ (R_{t+1}^A - R_{t+1}^D Q_t) a_{t+1}^B + R_{t+1}^D n_{t+1}^B \right]
$$

s.t.

$$Q_t a_{t+1}^B \leq \Omega_t^B n_{t+1}^B.$$ 

The Lagrange is given by

$$
\mathcal{L} = \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \left[ (R_{t+1}^A - R_{t+1}^D Q_t) a_{t+1}^B + R_{t+1}^D n_{t+1}^B \right] (1 + \lambda_t) - \lambda_t Q_t a_{t+1}^B
$$

where we substitute $\bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B = \eta + (1 - \eta) \Omega_{t+1}^B$. The first-order conditions are

$$
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} = \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \left[ (R_{t+1}^A - R_{t+1}^D Q_t) \right] (1 + \lambda_t) - \lambda_t Q_t - \\
- \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B n_{t+1}^B (1 + \lambda_t) \geq 0
$$

$$
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda_t} = \Omega_t^B n_t^B - Q_t a_{t+1}^B \geq 0
$$

$$
\lambda_t \geq 0
$$

$$
(\Omega_t^B n_t^B - Q_t a_{t+1}^B) \lambda_t = 0.
$$

We can define a bank run cutoff for the exogenous shock as

$$Z^*(a_{t+1}^B) = Z : n_{t+1}^B = 0.$$ 

Taking the derivative with respect to the bank run probability amounts to computing the change in this bank run cutoff:

$$
\frac{\partial}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} \mathbb{E}_t \frac{\partial p_{t+1}}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B n_{t+1}^B
$$

$$
= \frac{\partial}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} \left( \int_{Z^*(a_{t+1}^B)} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B n_{t+1}^B dF(Z) \right) - \int_{Z^*(a_{t+1}^B)} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \frac{\partial n_{t+1}^B}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} dF(Z),
$$

which, by Leibniz’ rule, collapses to

$$
- \frac{\partial Z^*(a_{t+1}^B)}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B n_{t+1}^B \bigg|_{Z=Z^*(a_{t+1}^B)}.
$$
which is 0 since \( n_{t+1}^B \mid Z = Z^* (a_{t+1}^B) = 0 \). Thus, the first-order conditions simplify to

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial a_{t+1}^B} = \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \left[ (R_{t+1}^A - R_{t+1}^D) Q_t \right] (1 + \lambda_t) - \lambda_t Q_t \geq 0 \tag{C.2}
\]

\[
\frac{\partial \mathcal{L}}{\partial \lambda_t} = \Omega_t^B n_t^B - Q_t a_{t+1}^B \geq 0 \tag{C.3}
\]

\[
\lambda_t \geq 0 \tag{C.4}
\]

\[
(\Omega_t^B n_t^B - Q_t a_{t+1}^B) \lambda_t = 0. \tag{C.5}
\]

Consider first the case where the borrowing constraint C.4 is binding. Then, the optimal policy of the bank is given by

\[
\hat{a}_{t+1}^B \equiv \frac{a_{t+1}^B}{n_t^B} = \frac{\Omega_t^B}{\psi Q_t}.
\]

With this, we can rewrite the value function as

\[
\Omega_t^B = \frac{\mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B R_{t+1}^D}{1 - \psi \mathbb{E}_t (1 - p_{t+1}) \Lambda_{t,t+1} \bar{\Omega}_{t+1}^B \left[ R_{t+1}^A Q_t - R_{t+1}^D \right]}.
\tag{C.6}
\]

This expression only depends on aggregate variables, as we initially guessed. Consider next the case of the non-binding constraint. In that case, only \( A_{t+1}^B \), i.e. the optimal policy of the entire banking sector, is pinned down by the first order condition C.2, with \( \lambda_t = 0 \). We assume that individual banks follow a rule

\[
\hat{a}_{t+1}^B = \frac{A_{t+1}^B}{N_t^B}, \tag{C.7}
\]

\[
a_{t+1}^B = \hat{a}_{t+1}^B n_t^B. \tag{C.8}
\]

This implies that the solution is again linear in the net worth of an individual bank, and we again can compute the value function of the bank as in C.6, showing that it only depends on aggregate values. Hence, we can indeed write the value function of the bank as \( V_t^B = \Omega_t^B n_t^B \).

\[\square\]

### D Full statement of the equilibrium

First, we characterize the equilibrium if the banking sector is solvent. We then highlight how the equilibrium changes if the banking sector is insolvent. Since we use the concept of a recursive competitive equilibrium, we switch to a recursive notation, i.e. \( X_t = X, X_{t+1} = X' \),
and $X_{t-1} = X_{t-1}$ for any variable $X$. Bold symbols denote functions.

### D.1 The equilibrium with solvent banks

The state of the economy is given by $\mathcal{Y} = (N^B, K, I_{t-1}, Z, \Xi)$. $\Xi \in \{\Xi^R, \Xi^N\}$ is a sunspot shock that selects in which equilibrium the economy is if there are multiple equilibria. It evolves according to a Markov chain, with

$$Pr(\Xi = \Xi^R) = p^R \quad (D.1)$$

A recursive competitive equilibrium is a set of price functions $Q(\mathcal{Y}), W(\mathcal{Y}), R^A(\mathcal{Y}), R^D(\mathcal{Y}), \bar{R}^P(\mathcal{Y})$ and $f(\mathcal{Y})$, perceived laws of motion of the states $K'(\mathcal{Y}, \epsilon', \Xi')$ and $N^B(\mathcal{Y}, \epsilon', \Xi')$ and a perceived banking panic probability $p(\mathcal{Y}, \epsilon', \Xi')$, a value function $V^H(\mathcal{Y})$ and policy functions $C^H(\mathcal{Y}), A^H(\mathcal{Y}), D^H(\mathcal{Y})$ and $\bar{A}^H(\mathcal{Y})$ for households, a value function $V^B(\mathcal{Y})$ and policy functions $A^B(\mathcal{Y})$ and $D^B(\mathcal{Y})$ for banks, policy functions for consumption goods producers, $S'(\mathcal{Y}), A^F(\mathcal{Y}), L(\mathcal{Y})$, a policy function for capital producers, $I(\mathcal{Y})$, and a policy function for mutual funds $\bar{A}^M(\mathcal{Y})$ that solve the respective optimization problems of all agents as defined in appendix B, clear the markets for retail loans,

$$A^F(\mathcal{Y}) = A^H(\mathcal{Y}) + A^B(\mathcal{Y}), \quad (D.2)$$

labor,

$$L^F(\mathcal{Y}) = 1, \quad (D.3)$$

investment goods,

$$I(\mathcal{Y}) = S^F(\mathcal{Y}) - (1 - \delta)K, \quad (D.4)$$

bank liabilities,

$$D^B(\mathcal{Y}) = D^H(\mathcal{Y}), \quad (D.5)$$

and loan services,

$$\bar{A}^H(\mathcal{Y}) = \bar{A}^M(\mathcal{Y}), \quad (D.6)$$

ensure that the perceived laws of motion correspond to the actual laws of motion for capital,

$$K'(\mathcal{Y}, \epsilon', \Xi') = Z \exp(\mu^Z + \sigma^Z \epsilon')S'(\mathcal{Y}), \quad (D.7)$$

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bank net worth,

\[
\text{\(N^B(Y, \epsilon', \Xi') = \begin{cases} N^B_{\text{No Run}}(Y, \epsilon', \Xi') & \text{with probability } 1 - p(Y, \epsilon', \Xi') \\ 0 & \text{with probability } p(Y, \epsilon', \Xi') \end{cases}\)}
\]

\[
(D.8)
\]

\[
\text{\(N^B_{\text{No Run}}(Y, \epsilon', \Xi') = [R^A(Y'(Y, \epsilon', \Xi'))A^B(Y) - R^D(Y)D^B(Y)](1 - \eta) + n^{B, \text{new}}\eta,\)}
\]

\[
(D.9)
\]

and satisfy the aggregate resource constraint 2.23. Asset returns are given by

\[
\tilde{R}^D(Y) = R^D(Y_{-1})
\]

\[
(D.10)
\]

and

\[
R^A(Y) = Z \left( \alpha K^{\alpha - 1} + (1 - \delta)Q^*(Y) \right).
\]

\[
(D.11)
\]

We summarize the laws of motion of the state as \(Y'(Y, \epsilon', \Xi')\). We specify the probability of a banking panic \(p(Y, \epsilon', \Xi')\) below.

### D.2 The equilibrium with a systemic bank default

We denote functions relating to the equilibrium with a systemic bank default with a star (*). If incumbent banks are insolvent, their net worth is 0. We assume that, conditional on the incumbent banks being insolvent, new bankers do not enter the economy and return their resources to the representative household. Hence, the aggregate net worth of the banking sector is 0 and the state of the economy collapses to \(Y^* = (K, I_{-1}, Z, \Xi)\). The asset demand of banks is zero, as is the amount of debt issued by banks:

\[
A^B^*(Y^*) = 0,
\]

\[
(D.12)
\]

\[
D^B^*(Y^*) = 0.
\]

\[
(D.13)
\]

The capital price is given by \(Q^*(Y^*)\), the return to firm loans by

\[
R^{A^*}(Y^*) = Z \left( \alpha K^{\alpha - 1} + (1 - \delta)Q^*(Y^*) \right).
\]

\[
(D.14)
\]

In the quantitative solution to the model, the demand for assets by banks, and hence the demand for assets overall, is increasing in the net worth of banks. Hence, the capital price with insolvent banks is lower than the capital price with solvent banks.

In the equilibrium with insolvent banks, the households recover the assets of the banks.
instead of their lending. Hence, the return on loans to banks is given by

\[ \tilde{R}^D(Y^*) = x^D(Y_{-1}, \varepsilon, \Xi)R^D(Y_{-1}) \]  

(D.15)

and

\[ x^D(Y_{-1}, \varepsilon, \Xi) = \frac{R^A(Y^*)A^B(Y_{-1})}{R^D(Y_{-1})D^B(Y_{-1})}. \]  

(D.16)

Incumbent banks exit once they are liquidated. Panics are persistent and continue into the next period with probability \(1 - \pi\). New banks start re-entering the economy at rate \(\eta\) only once the panic has ended. Formally, this assumption implies that the net worth of the banking sector evolves as

\[ N^B(Y^*, \varepsilon', \Xi') = \begin{cases} 
\eta_{n_{B, new}}' & \text{with probability } \pi \\
0 & \text{with probability } 1 - \pi \end{cases}. \]  

(D.17)